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In this thesis we present a new method for building pairs of HFE1 polynomials of high
degree, in such a way that the map constructed with this pair is easy to invert. The
inversion is accomplished using a low degree polynomial of Hamming weight three, which is
derived from a special reduction via Hamming weight three polynomials produced by these
two HFE polynomials. This allows us to build new candidates for multivariate trapdoor
functions in which we use the pair of HFE polynomials to fabricate the core map.
Using this new multivariate trapdoor function we derive an encryption scheme in a similar
way as the HFE scheme is created. We show that this encryption scheme is relatively efficient
and that it resists the attacks that have threatened the security of HFE. Finally, we propose
parameters for a practical implementation of our cryptosystem.
1HFE stands for Hidden Field Equations.
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Resumen
En esta tesis presentamos un nuevo método para construir parejas de polinomios HFE 2 de
grado alto, de tal manera que la función construida con esta pareja es fácil de invertir. La
inversión se lleva a cabo utilizando un polinomio de grado bajo y de peso de Hamming tres,
el cual se deriva por medio de una reducción especial, a través de polinomios de peso de
Hamming tres producidos a partir de estos dos polinomios HFE. Esto nos permite construir
nuevas candidatas para funciones de puerta trasera multivariadas, en las cuales utilizamos
la pareja de polinomios HFE para construir la función central.
Utilizando esta nueva función de puerta trasera multivariada derivamos un esquema de
cifrado de una manera similar a como se construye el esquema HFE. Demostramos que este
esquema de cifrado es relativamente eficiente y que resiste los ataques que han amenazado
la seguridad de HFE. Finalmente, proponemos parámetros para una aplicación práctica de
nuestro criptosistema.
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The public-key cryptosystems currently being used in practice are based on the difficulty of
factoring large integers or solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem. In 1996 P. Shor published
an algorithm to solve both problems in polynomial time on a quantum computer [43]. Some
experts argue that it is possible to build in the coming years a quantum computer, which is
a threat to our modern communication system. This leads to the recent fast development of
Post-Quantum Cryptography, which refers to the study of schemes that have the potential
to resist the future quantum computer attacks [3].
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography is part of the Post-Quantum Cryptography. In a
multivariate public key scheme (MPK scheme) the public key consists of a set of multivariate
quadratic polynomials over a finite field. One of the main MPK schemes is named Hidden
Field Equations (HFE), proposed by Patarin in 1996 [39]. The public key in HFE is formed
by “hiding” a core polynomial F by two invertible affine transformations, and using the
vector space structure of a field extension of the base field.
A crucial part in HFE is the choice of the degree D of the core polynomial F . The
degree D cannot be too big otherwise the decryption process would not be efficient. The
main attacks against HFE, direct algebraic attack and the Kipnis-Shamir MinRank attack,
1
exploit this fact. For characteristic 2, HFE is vulnerable to the direct algebraic attack [25].
Recently, some authors improved the KS attack and were able to break certain HFE systems,
over both even and odd characteristic [4].
1.2 Motivation
There exist secure and efficient MPK signature schemes (one example is Rainbow [15]) but
we do not know secure and efficient MPK encryption schemes, since all the ones proposed
have been broken.
Some variants of HFE have been proposed as encryption schemes, but all of them have
been proven to be insecure. Perhaps the reason for this fact is the low degree and the low
rank of the polynomial used as core map for these systems. This degree cannot be too large
because the decryption process would be very slow. One question arises:
• Is there any way to enlarge the degree of the core polynomial of an HFE encryption
scheme without affecting the efficiency of the decryption process?
Using some especially constructed HFE polynomials as the core map in HFE, we give here
an affirmative answer to this question. So far we know that no one has proposed any idea
to use high degree polynomials for the core map in HFE or some of its variants. The low
degree D of the core polynomial F was always considered an immovable. We developed
a special reduction method that enables us to build multivariate trapdoor functions using
core polynomials of high degree in an HFE scheme. From the trapdoor functions we derive
a very efficient encryption scheme which resists the major currently known attacks against
these kind of cryptosystems.
2
1.3 Our approach
The idea of our construction is inspired by the first steps of the ZZ algorithm [15]. Given
a finite field k of size q and a field extension K of degree n, we consider two high degree











qi + c̃, where the coefficients aij, bi, c, ãij, b̃i, c̃ ∈ K are to be determined.
The idea behind the method is to construct a low degree polynomial Ψ of Hamming weight
three of the form
Ψ =X
(





αn+1F0 + · · ·+ α2nFn−1 + βn+1F̃0 + · · ·+ β2nF̃n−1
)
,
where F0, F1, · · · , Fn−1 are the Frobenius powers of F , and F̃0, F̃1, · · · , F̃n−1 are the Frobenius
powers of F̃ .
To obtain such a polynomial Ψ we need to determine the coefficients of F and F̃ , also
the scalars αi and βi, such that the degree of Ψ is less than or equal than a fixed positive
integer D0 (the integer D0 is such that we can easily invert Ψ using Berlekamp’s algorithm).
To achieve this, we derive a system of equations from the vanishing coefficients of the terms
in Ψ of degree higher than D0. After randomly choosing in this system the scalars αi and
βi, we get a linear system with more variables than equations, and thus we can guarantee
nontrivial solutions for it. This linear system has about n3 variables and therefore we have
to deal with huge matrices to reach large values of n. On the plus side we have that these
matrices are sparse, which is an advantage in terms of efficiency.
The new multivariate trapdoor function is built in a similar way to the HFE scheme
(composition with invertible affine linear transformations), except that now the core map is
replaced by the map G = (F, F̃ ). The main part of the inversion of the trapdoor function
is to invert the map G, which is achieved using the low degree polynomial Ψ of Hamming
3
weight three and the scalars αi and βi.
We use the new trapdoor function to construct a new encryption scheme. Since we are
utilizing high degree HFE polynomials for the core map, we expect that the public key has
high degree of regularity, very different from what was observed by Faugère and Joux [25]
for a system of quadratic equations derived from a single HFE polynomial with low degree.
Our extensive experiments confirmed that the public key of the new encryption scheme has
high degree of regularity (it increases as n increases). This high degree of regularity shows
that our new encryption scheme is secure against the direct algebraic attack.
For odd q, we implemented the KS MinRank attack and observed that the minimum rank
increases as n increases. Therefore this attack would not work in this case against the new
encryption scheme. For the case q = 2, we can give a theoretical argument to show why
the KS MinRank attack does not work against the new encryption scheme, based on some
results about the degree of regularity obtained by Ding and Hodges [17].
After testing the direct algebraic and KS MinRank attacks for several values of q and n,
we suggest parameters for a secure and efficient encryption scheme.
The method described here was not our first attempt to reduce high degree HFE polyno-
mials along the same line. Among failed attempts, we considered using a single polynomial
F . However, the linear systems that we needed to solve had more equations than variables
and then we could not guarantee nontrivial solutions for them. This lead us to use two
HFE polynomials instead of one in order to get a linear system with more variables than
equations and this gives the construction in this thesis.
1.4 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we present some basic concepts
about cryptography. In particular we discuss public key encryption schemes and multivariate
4
public key encryption schemes. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the study of two of the
main multivariate public key encryption schemes: MI and HFE cryptosystems. In Chapter
5 we study the Zhuang-Zi algorithm, a tool for solving multivariate systems over a finite field
which has inspired this work. Chapters 6 and 7 contain the original work of this dissertation.
In Chapter 6 we construct new candidates for multivariate trapdoor functions and we show
how to invert these trapdoor functions. From these trapdoor functions we derive a new
encryption scheme in Chapter 7. We present some conclusions and discuss future work
in Chapter 8. The Appendix contains some additional data produced by the experiments




We begin by presenting some basic concepts and procedures of cryptography. Then we
discuss two of the main encryption schemes used today in public key cryptography. Finally,
we introduce multivariate public key cryptography, the area in which our research is framed.
2.1 Elementary ideas in cryptography
Cryptography is the science that studies the methods to protect integrity and confiden-
tiality of information. Cryptography has been used historically by secret communication
agencies. Today, with the rise of the Internet, cryptography is essential to secure communi-
cation, digitally sign documents, access controls, E-commerce, electronic vote, among other
applications.
One of the main activities in cryptography, although not the only one, is exchanging
or storing information in a secure way. This task is accomplished by means of encryption
schemes1.
Definition 2.1. An encryption scheme or a cryptosystem is a tuple (M, C,K, E ,D) such
that:
• M is a set called the plaintext space and its elements are called plaintexts. C is a set
1Cryptography also studies other important topics as signature and authentication schemes
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called the ciphertext space and its elements are called ciphertexts. K is a set called the
key space and its elements are called keys.
• E = {Ee : e ∈ K} is a set of functions Ee : M → C. The elements of E are called
encryption functions. For a plaintext (message) m ∈ M and a key e ∈ K, c = Ee(m)
is called a ciphertext of the message m.
• D = {Dd : d ∈ K} is a set of functions Dd : C → M. The elements of D are called
decryption functions.
• For each e ∈ K there exists a unique d ∈ K such that Dd(Ee(m)) = m for all m ∈M.
For an encryption function Ee the key e is called an encryption key and for a decryption
function Dd the key d is called a decryption key. Notice that if an encryption key e is
fixed, every plaintext m ∈ M is encrypted in the same ciphertext for anyone who uses the
encryption function Ee. Therefore Definition 2.1 describes what is called a deterministic
encryption scheme. One problem with deterministic schemes is that it is difficult to prove
anything about their security. For this reason industrial applications usually use probabilistic
encryption schemes, introduced in 1982 by Goldwasser and Micali [27]. In a probabilistic
scheme three different probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms are used for key generation,
encryption and decryption (for a precise definition see [31]). A disadvantage of probabilistic
schemes is that some of them are vulnerable to certain chosen-ciphertext attacks.
According to the way their keys are shared, the encryption schemes are divided into two
classes. The first class is called private key (symmetric) encryption schemes and the second
one is called public key (asymmetric) encryption schemes. We now define these two classes.
Definition 2.2. A private key (symmetric) encryption scheme is a cryptosystem where for
each pair of keys (e, d) ∈ K×K, it is computationally feasible2 to determine the decryption
2We will use the term “computationally feasible” for a problem that is easy to solve, in the sense that there exists a
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key d from the encryption key e. In this case both keys are kept secret.
In a symmetric cryptosystem we usually have that the encryption key e and the decryption
key d are the same. If Alice wants to communicate with Bob using a symmetric cryptosystem,
she must previously exchange with him the private (secret) key e. One secure way to share
this private key is using an asymmetric encryption scheme.
Definition 2.3. A public key (asymmetric) encryption scheme is a cryptosystem where for
each pair of keys (e, d) ∈ K×K, it is computationally infeasible to determine the decryption
key d from the encryption key e. The encryption key e is made public and the decryption
key d is kept private. In this way, anyone can encrypt a message and send it to the owner
of the private, who can use this private key to recover the original plaintext.
The encryption/decryption process is generally slower for public key schemes than for
symmetric schemes. However, public key schemes have the advantage that the keys do not
need to be exchanged previously. Therefore, in practice, a hybrid system is often used, in
which a public key scheme is utilized to exchange the private key for a symmetric scheme,
and the latter is used to share the information.
2.2 Cryptanalysis
In this section we discuss briefly the security of a cryptosystem. The study of the attacks
against cryptosystems is known as cryptanalysis. An attack on a cryptosystem is a method
that seeks to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext. If in addition the attack tries to find
the decryption key, it is called a key-recovery attack or a structural attack. We say that
an attack breaks a cryptosystem if it allows to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext
efficiently. Depending on the knowledge and the abilities required to perform an attack,
these can be classified as follows.
polynomial time algorithm to solve it using a low amount of time. And we will use the term “computationally infeasible” for
a problem for which there are no known efficient algorithms to solve it in realistic time.
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Ciphertext-only attack. The attacker only knows a ciphertext. An example of this attack
is the exhaustive search, which tests all possible keys or plaintexts until the correct one is
found.
Known-plaintext attack. The attacker knows a pair plaintext/ciphertext (or several such
pairs). For example, many letters begin with the word “hello” and therefore an attacker can
know the ciphertext corresponding to this word. With this information the attacker can try
to decrypt other ciphertexts.
Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). The attacker is able to encrypt plaintexts of his choice.
This attack is always a threat for public key cryptosystems because the encryption key is
known by anyone.
Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). The attacker is able to decrypt ciphertexts of his choice.
This attack is a threat for some probabilistic encryption schemes. This attack gives birth to
a type of security analysis for a cryptosystem called a CCA-secure test (see [31]).
2.3 Public Key Cryptography
In Section 2.1 we have defined public key encryption schemes (see Definition 2.3). However,
public key cryptography comprises a more general set up, in which we can mention, for
example, public key encryption schemes, signature schemes and authentication schemes.
In this section we review some general ideas which are the foundation of any construction
related to public key cryptography.
In 1976 Diffie and Hellman introduced the basic idea of public key cryptography [13].
Two important concepts in public key cryptography are one-way and trapdoor functions.
We give here informal definitions for these notions. For more precise definitions see [31].
Definition 2.4. Let M and C be two sets. A function f : M → C is called a one-way
function if it is easy to compute but it is hard to “invert”. By easy to compute we mean
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that there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute f(m) for any m ∈ M. By hard
to invert we mean that there are no known efficient algorithms to compute pre-images of a
randomly selected c ∈ Im f ⊆ C.
In public key cryptography we are interested in a kind of functions that are one-way
from the point of view of an attacker, but that are easy to invert for a legitimate user, who
knows some additional information related to the construction of the function. Such maps
are called trapdoor functions.
Definition 2.5. Let M and C be two sets. A function f : M → C is called a trapdoor
function if it is easy to compute but it is hard to invert without the knowledge of some
private information called the trapdoor. The function must be easy to invert for everyone
who knows the trapdoor information.
One of the most important trapdoor functions in cryptography comes from number theory
and it is the following.
Example 2.6. Randomly choose two large prime numbers p 6= q of the same size (512 or
1024 bits). Set n = pq and select a positive integer e relatively prime to φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1).
Let d = e−1 mod φ(n), M = C = Z/nZ and define the function f :M→ C by
f(x) = xe mod n.
Modular exponentiation is easy to compute because it can be done in polynomial time.
Inverting f is a simple task if you know d because xed ≡ x mod n.
Why is f a trapdoor function? The computation of d requires the knowledge of φ(n).
Computing φ(n) is computationally equivalent to factoring n = pq, and factoring large
integers is currently computationally infeasible. Therefore, f is a trapdoor function and the
trapdoor information is the integer d.
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Although Diffie and Hellman introduced the notion of public key cryptography in 1976, the
first public key encryption scheme was only proposed until 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adle-
man [42], which was named after them: RSA. This encryption scheme is constructed using
the trapdoor function f introduced in Example 2.6. The keys for RSA can be summarized
as follows:
• Public key: the trapdoor function f .
• Private key: the integer d.
If Bob wants to use RSA to send a message m ∈M to Alice, he utilizes Alice’s public key f to
calculate the ciphertext c = f(m) = me mod n and send this ciphertext to Alice. To recover
the plaintext from the ciphertext, Alice uses her private key d to compute m = cd mod n.
ElGamal [23] is another important public key scheme that is based on number theory.
Its security relies on the difficulty of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem, i.e., to solve
for x in the congruence
ax ≡ b mod n,
for given integers a, b, and a large positive integer n.
Nowadays RSA, ElGamal, and other public key cryptosystems – that are based on number
theory – are widely used in multiple applications. However, cryptographers are still in the
search of new schemes, mainly due to two reasons. The first reason is to find more efficient
schemes and the second one is because of the threats against existing schemes. One of these
threats is the possible emergence of quantum computers. Such computers can factor large
integers and solve the discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time [43].
Post-Quantum Cryptography refers to cryptosystems that are resistant to quantum com-
puter attacks. The major research in this area focuses on Hash-based cryptography, Code-
based cryptography, Lattice-based cryptography and Multivariate public key cryptography.
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For a review in Post-Quantum Cryptography see [3].
The new encryption scheme that we propose in this thesis belongs to Multivariate Public
Key Cryptography. Because of that we dedicate the rest of this chapter to describe these
schemes.
2.4 Multivariate Public key Cryptography
As an alternative to existing public key schemes, Multivariate Public Key Cryptography has
emerged [15]. The security of a multivariate public key encryption scheme (MPK encryption
scheme) is suggested by the fact that solving a randomly system of multivariate quadratic
polynomial equations over a finite field is an NP-hard problem [26]. This is known as the
MQ-problem (multivariate quadratic problem). Moreover, it seems that quantum computers
have no advantage over the traditional computers attacking this problem. Before we describe
an MPK encryption scheme we establish some terminology used in this work.
The terminology given in this section is used throughout this work, unless otherwise
noted. By k we denote a finite field of size q. We consider a degree n irreducible polynomial
g (y) ∈ k [y], and let K be the degree n extension field k [y] / (g (y)), which has qn elements.
We denote by ϕ the standard k-linear isomorphism between K and kn given by
ϕ
(
u1 + u2y + . . .+ uny
n−1) = (u1, u2, . . . , un) .
We know that the ring of functions from kn to k is isomorphic to the quotient ring
k [x1, · · · , xn] / (xq1 − x1, · · · , xqn − xn) .
Abusing the notation we identify the elements of this ring with the polynomials in k [x1, · · · , xn].





and we identify this ring with the ring of polynomials K[X].
Besides the standard degree of a polynomial in K[X] we will need to define its q-weight.
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Definition 2.7. We say that a polynomial F (X) ∈ K[X] has q-weight W (or Hamming
weight W ) if the maximum of the q-Hamming weights of all its exponents is W . The q-
Hamming weight of a non-negative integer is the sum of the q-digits of its q-nary expansion.
For example, if q = 3, the 3-weight of the polynomial F (X) = X27 +X20 +X11 +X2 + 1 is







To build a MPK encryption scheme we use a multivariate trapdoor function (p1, · · · , pm) :
kn → km, where each pi : kn → k can be represented as a nonlinear polynomial over the small
field k. Therefore the public key is a sequence of nonlinear (usually quadratic) polynomials:
P = (p1(x1, · · · , xn), · · · , pm(x1, · · · , xn)),
where pi ∈ k[x1, · · · , xn]. Some trapdoor information is saved as private key in order to
invert P , i.e., to find pre-images of P . The public key polynomials are chosen quadratic
to reduce the public key size and also for efficiency reasons in the encryption/decryption
process.
If Bob wishes to send a plaintext (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ kn to Alice, he calculates the ciphertext
(y1, · · · , ym) = (p1(x1, · · · , xn), · · · , pm(x1, · · · , xn)),
and then he sends to Alice the ciphertext (y1, · · · , ym) across some possibly insecure channel.
To recover the plaintext Alice uses her private key to invert P .
Naturally, a random set of quadratic polynomials would not have a trapdoor and therefore
would not be usable for building a MPK encryption scheme. Nevertheless, there exist several
ways to construct MPK encryption schemes whose public key polynomials are not exactly
random but are expected to behave as if they were. One of these ways is known as the
big-field idea.
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2.5 The big-field idea
The big-field idea is one of the several ways to generate a MPK encryption scheme. Select a
q-weight two polynomial F (X) ∈ K[X] and choose two invertible affine transformations S
and T from kn to kn. Let ϕ : K → kn be the standard k-linear isomorphism between K and
kn. The public key polynomials are generated by hiding the polynomial F (X) by means of
the affine transformations S and T . More precisely, the public key is the map P : kn 7→ kn
given by
P (x1, . . . , xn) = T ◦ ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S (x1, ..., xn) .
We refer to F as the core map of the scheme. The public key P constructed in this way
turns out to be a set of multivariate quadratic polynomials. This fact was proven in [32],
but we present here a matrix-based and constructive proof. First, as in [4], we write the
isomorphism ϕ and its inverse ϕ−1 in matrix form.
For a basis θ1, · · · , θn of K over k, consider the matrix ∆ whose columns are the Frobenius
























The matrix ∆ is invertible because θ1, · · · , θn is a basis of K over k ([33], Pag. 109).
Lemma 2.8. Let X = x1θ1 + · · ·+ xnθn be an element of K. Then we have
(x1, · · · , xn)∆ =
(
X,Xq, · · · , Xqn−1
)
.
Proof. Since the Frobenius powers are linear transformations and they fix the elements of
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the small field k, we have that


























X,Xq, · · · , Xqn−1
)
.
As a consequence, we can write the isomorphism ϕ and its inverse ϕ−1 in matrix form.
Corollary 2.9. For X = x1θ1 + · · ·+ xnθn ∈ K we have
ϕ(X) =
(




ϕ−1(x1, · · · , xn) = ((x1, · · · , xn)∆)[1] = X,
where ((x1, · · · , xn)∆)[1] denotes the first component of the vector (x1, · · · , xn)∆.
As it was pointed out in [4], the matrix form of ϕ and ϕ−1 allows us to lift a quadratic mul-
tivariate system to a q-weight two polynomial in a more simple and efficient way. Moreover,
the public key of a scheme derived from the big-field idea can be generated using matrix
products. These two facts are the content of the proof that we give here for the follow-
ing theorem. For simplicity, in the next theorem ~x denotes the vector (x1, · · · , xn) and ~X
denotes the vector
(
X,Xq, · · · , Xqn−1
)
.
Theorem 2.10. Consider a map f : kn → kn. Then, each component of f is a quadratic
polynomial over k if and only if the lifting F = ϕ−1 ◦ f ◦ ϕ is a q-weight two polynomial in
K[X].
Moreover, we can give the exact matrix representation of F : if each component fi of f is
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of the form fi (~x) = ~xAi~x
t + Bi~x
t + ci, where Ai ∈ Mn×n (k), Bi ∈ M1×n (k), and ci ∈ k,
i = 1, · · · , n, then its lifting is the q-weight two polynomial





















c = (θ1, · · · , θn) (c1, · · · , cn)t .
In particular, if each component of f is linear, its lifting is the q-weight one polynomial
F = B ~X t + c.
Proof. (⇒) For simplicity we suppose that fi (~x) = ~xAi~x t, where Ai ∈ Mn×n (k), i =







)t ~X t, · · · , ~X∆−1An (∆−1)t ~X t)
= (y1, · · · , yn) ,
where yi = ~X∆
−1Ai (∆
−1)
t ~X t. Using one more time Corollary 2.9 we get
ϕ−1 (y1, · · · , yn) = ((y1, · · · , yn) ∆) [1] .
Therefore
F (X) =ϕ−1 (f(ϕ(X)))
=ϕ−1 (y1, · · · , yn)
= ((y1, · · · , yn) ∆) [1]
























(⇐) For simplicity we suppose that the lifting F = ϕ−1◦f ◦ϕ is a q-weight two polynomial
of the form F = ~XA ~X t, where A ∈ Mn×n (K). Notice that f = ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 (~x). If we set











where the scalars aij ∈ K are the components of the matrix ∆A∆t.
If we write each scalar aij in terms of the basis θ1, · · · , θn, we get that F (ϕ−1 (~x)) =
f1 (~x) θ1 + · · · + fn (~x) θn, where fi is a quadratic polynomial in k[x1, · · · , xn]. Therefore,
f = ϕ (F (ϕ−1 (~x))) = (f1 (~x) , · · · , fn (~x)) is a quadratic system from kn to kn.
The procedure in the proof of the implication (⇒) of Theorem 2.10 can be used to lift a
quadratic system f : kn → kn to a polynomial F : K → K (see Section 5.2). Moreover, in
Chapter 7 we will use the procedure that we just showed in the proof of the implication (⇐)
to generate efficiently the public key of the new encryption scheme.
In the next two chapters we discuss two encryption schemes based on the big-field idea,




The first relevant MPK encryption scheme was propose in 1988 by Matsumoto and Imai
[35]. They named their scheme C∗ but it was later known as the MI cryptosystem. MI
is built via the big-field idea with a specific and invertible core polynomial F . Although
MI was broken, it has inspired many of the proposed schemes in multivariate public key
cryptography.
3.1 Description of MI
Let k be a finite field of characteristic 2 and size q, and let g (y) ∈ k [y] be an irreducible
polynomial of degree n. We define the quotient K = k [y] / (g (y)), which is an extension




u1 + u2y + . . .+ uny
n−1) = (u1, u2, . . . , un) .
Choose an integer θ such that 0 < θ < n and gcd
(
qθ + 1, qn − 1
)
= 1. Consider the function
F : K → K defined by
F (X) = Xq
θ+1.
The conditions assumed on θ guarantee that the function F is invertible. In fact
F−1 (X) = X t,
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≡ 1 mod (qn − 1) .
Now choose two invertible affine transformations S and T over kn. The public key of the
MI scheme is the trapdoor function P : kn → kn given by
P (x1, ..., xn) = T ◦ ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S (x1, ..., xn) .
Notice that P is an n−tuple
P (x1, . . . , xn) = (p1(x1, . . . , xn), · · · , pn(x1, . . . , xn)) .
The private key consists of the transformations S and T (see Figure 3.1). Since F is a
q-weight two polynomial, Theorem 2.10 assures that the polynomials p1, ..., pn are quadratic













Figure 3.1: MI scheme.
Neither the privacy of the isomorphism ϕ nor the privacy of the parameter θ contribute to
the security of MI. Since all finite fields of size qn are isomorphic, hiding the isomorphism
ϕ has no effect on the security of MI. Moreover, there are fewer than n choices for θ that
satisfy the conditions above, so keeping the parameter θ private does not greatly affect the
complexity of the attacks against MI. Therefore the keys for MI are as follows:
Public key of MI. The public key of the MI encryption scheme includes:
• The field k and its structure.
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• The trapdoor function P (x1, . . . , xn) = (p1(x1, . . . , xn), · · · , pn(x1, . . . , xn)) .
Private key of MI. The private key of the MI encryption scheme includes:
• The two invertible affine transformations S and T .
Encryption and decryption in MI. To encrypt a plaintext (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ kn we simply
evaluate the public key P in the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext
(y1, · · · , yn) = T ◦ ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ kn.
The plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext inverting each component of P , i.e.,
(x1, · · · , xn) = S−1 ◦ ϕ ◦ F−1 ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ T−1 (y1, ..., yn) .
3.2 Cryptanalysis of MI
In 1995 Patarin broke the MI scheme in [38]. His key observation was that the core map
Y = Xq
θ+1 satisfies the equation
XY q
θ − Y Xq2θ = 0,













cjyj + d = 0,
where aij, bi, cj, d ∈ k.
The last equations are known as the linearization equations. The set of all linearization
equations is a vector space over k. Notice that for each ciphertext (y1, · · · , yn) we obtain
a set of linear equations in the variables xi for which the plaintext is a solution. Since an
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attacker knows the public key, she can generate all of these equations. This leads us to the
following question. How many of these equations can be generated from a given ciphertext
that are linearly independent? The following theorem was proved by Patarin in [38].
Theorem 3.1. Let (p1, · · · , pn) be the MI public key and fix a ciphertext ~z = (z1, · · · , zn).
Let L~z be the space of linear equations derived by replacing the variable yi by zi in each
linearization equation. Then




Therefore, for a given plaintext an attacker can generate many linear equations for which the
plaintext is a solution. If he can derive a system of linear equations with unique solution, this
should be the plaintext. Even if the attacker cannot find directly the plaintext from these
linear equations, he can add these linear equations to the quadratic public key equations
derived from the ciphertext to make the system of equations much easier to solve.
3.3 Some variants of MI
In order to prevent the linearization equations attack and other subsequent attacks, a lot of
MI variants have been proposed. In [41] some MI variants were proposed, among which we
find the Minus and the Plus methods. The Minus and the Plus methods are not exclusive
for MI, they can be applied to other multivariate public key schemes.
The Minus method . Consider a multivariate scheme with public key P = (p1, · · · , pm).
The Minus method simply removes the last r polynomials of P and thus it leads to a new
public key P− = (p1, · · · , pm−r). This causes the new system to be highly non injective and
hence the Minus method is only suitable to create a signature scheme.
The Minus variant of MI is denoted by MI−. SFlash [40] is a version of MI− with the
special parameters q = 27, n = 37, θ = 11 and r = 11. A version of SFlash, called SFlashv2,
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was accepted in 2004 by the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption
(NESSIE), for short digital signatures. Unfortunately, SFlash was broken in 2007 by Dubois
et al. [21].
The Plus method . Given a multivariate scheme with public key P = (p1, · · · , pm), the
Plus method adds to P a number s of randomly chosen polynomials f1, · · · , fs. Then
these polynomials are mixed into the public key using an invertible affine transformation L.
Therefore, the new public key is the map P+ : kn 7→ km+s given by
P+ = L ◦ (p1, · · · , pm, f1, · · · , fs) .
The Plus method does not try to fix the security of the original system, but rather to make
a new inyective map P+ from a non inyective map P . In this direction, the Plus method is
frequently used together with the Minus method to obtain the so called Minus-Plus method
which can be utilized for encription.
The Minus-Plus variant of MI is denoted by MI±. One problem of this scheme is the
choice of the parameters r and s. For security reasons r cannot be too small and for
efficiency reasons s cannot be too big.
The MI encryption scheme is a particular case of the HFE encryption scheme that we
will discuss in the next chapter. Therefore the KS MinRank attack that we will present in
Section 4.4 also breaks MI and the above variants.
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Chapter 4
Hidden Field Equations (HFE)
The Hidden Field Equations scheme (HFE) was proposed by Patarin in 1996 [39] as a
generalization of the MI scheme. Unlike MI, the base field in HFE does not need to be of
characteristic 2. Moreover, the core map in HFE is not as specific as in MI and it is not
one-to-one in general.
4.1 Description of HFE
Let k be a finite field of size q. Fix n ∈ N and take an irreducible polynomial g over k of
degree n. Consider the field extension K = k[y]/ (g(y)). Then K ∼= kn, via the isomorphism
ϕ : K → kn defined by ϕ (u1 + u2y + . . .+ unyn−1) = (u1, u2, . . . , un) . For building an HFE
scheme we require some special weight two polynomials over K.










where the coefficients aij, bi and c are choosing randomly in K. We say that F is an HFE
polynomial. If in addition, we require that deg(F ) ≤ D, where D is a fixed positive integer,
we say that F is an HFE polynomial with bound D.
For a fixed D, an HFE scheme is built as follows. First, we randomly choose an HFE
polynomial with bound D, say F : K → K. Then, we randomly choose two invertible affine
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transformations S and T over kn. The public key P is the composition of F with the
transformations S and T , together with the isomorphism ϕ. More precisely,
P (x1, . . . , xn) = T ◦ ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S (x1, ..., xn) .
Notice that P is an n−tuple
P (x1, . . . , xn) = (p1(x1, . . . , xn), · · · , pn(x1, . . . , xn)) ,
where each pi is a multivariate polynomial.














Figure 4.1: HFE scheme.
To construct an HFE scheme we need to be very careful with the choice of the degree bound
D. This bound cannot be too high since this would affect the decryption process. Also, D
cannot be too small because this would make the system vulnerable to attacks explained
below.
Public key of HFE. The public key of the HFE encryption scheme includes:
• The field k and its structure.
• The trapdoor function P (x1, . . . , xn) = (p1(x1, . . . , xn), · · · , pn(x1, . . . , xn)) .
Private key of HFE. The private key of the HFE encryption scheme includes:
• The core polynomial F .
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• The two invertible affine transformations S and T .
Encryption in HFE. To encrypt a plaintext (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ kn we simply evaluate the
public key P = T ◦ ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S in the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext (y1, · · · , yn) =
P (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ kn.
Decryption in HFE. To recover the plaintext from the ciphertext we invert each part of
P as follows.
• We first compute (w1, · · · , wn) = T−1 (y1, · · · , yn).
• Next we find Y = ϕ−1 (w1, · · · , wn).
• At this step we must invert F , i.e., we must solve the equation F (X) = Y . This
equation can have multiple solutions because F is not injective in general. Let Z be
the set
Z = {X ∈ K/F (X) = Y } .
This is the main step of the decryption with respect to the complexity. To perform






Therefore the degree D of F cannot be too large. If the characteristic of k is odd we
can use Cantor-Zassenhaus’ algorithm which is slightly faster.
• For each element X ∈ Z we find the vector ϕ (X).
• Finally, we apply the transformation S−1 to each vector found in the previous step and
these are the candidates to be the plaintext. To determine which of these is the original
plaintext, some redundant information must be added to the plaintext.
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4.2 Toy example
We present here an example that shows step by step how the HFE scheme works. Let
q = 4 and n = 4. Consider the field with four elements k = GF (2) (a), where a is an
element of k that satisfies a2 + a + 1 = 0. We select the irreducible polynomial g(y) =
y4 + y3 + a2y2 + a2y + a2 ∈ k[y]. A degree n extension field of k is K = k[y]/ (g(y)). We
choose a generator b ∈ K of the multiplicative group of K such that g(b) = 0. We use the
following HFE polynomial with degree D = 8:
F (X) =b2X4+4 + b138X4+1 + b146X1+1 + b95X4 + b94X + b112
=b2X8 + b138X5 + b95X4 + b146X2 + b94X + b112.









b146 b138 0 0
0 b2 0 0
0 0 0 0























Notice that the low degree of F leads to a low rank of the matrix associated to the quadratic
part of F , which is one of the main weaknesses of HFE.
We select the invertible affine transformations
S(x1, x2, x3, x4) =

1 a a 1
a a a2 a
a2 0 0 a

















T (x1, x2, x3, x4) =

a2 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 a a a




















2x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + ax
2
2 + x2x3 + a
2x2x4 + x
2
3 + ax3x4 + ax3 + ax
2





2x1x4 + ax1 + ax
2
2 + x2x3 + a
2x2x4 + ax2 + x
2
3 + x3x4 + ax3 + x
2
4 + a,




2x2x4 + x2 + a
2x23 + a





2x1x2 + x1x3 + a





4 + ax4 + a.
In order to illustrate the encryption and decryption processes, we choose as plaintext
(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (0, 1, a, 0). After evaluating the public key at the plaintext we get the
ciphertext (y1, y2, y3, y4) = (a
2, 0, a, 1). If we want to recover the plaintext from the cipher-
text we first compute
T−1
(




a2, 0, 0, 1
)
.
We then find ϕ−1 (a2, 0, 0, 1) = b62. Now we need to solve the equation F (X) = b62, i.e.,
b2X8 + b138X5 + b95X4 + b146X2 + b94X + b112 = b62.






We next apply the isomorphism ϕ to each element of Z and we get ϕ (b9) = (0, a, a2, a)
and ϕ (b166) = (1, a, a, a). The candidates to be the plaintext are obtained by applying the
transformation S−1, and they are
S−1
(




a2, a2, 0, a
)
and S−1 (1, a, a, a) = (0, 1, a, 0) .
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We note that one of these elements is the original plaintext (0, 1, a, 0).
4.3 Algebraic attack
Suppose that an attacker intercepts a ciphertext (y1, · · · , yn). Since she has access to the
public key P = (p1, · · · , pn), she can form the equations
p1(x1, . . . , xn)− y1 = 0,
p2(x1, . . . , xn)− y2 = 0,
...
pn(x1, . . . , xn)− yn = 0.
If the attacker finds all the solutions of this system of equations she can determine the
plaintext. Solving this system directly is known as the algebraic attack. There exist several
algorithms to perform this attack, among which we can mention the XL algorithm [8], the
Mutant XL algorithms [14, 36, 37] and the F4 algorithm [24]. In 2003, by means of a special
version of the F4 algorithm, called the F5 algorithm, Faugère and Joux [25] broke the first
HFE challenge (q = 2, n = 80, D = 96) proposed by Patarin in [39]. In the F5 algorithm
the field equations x2i − xi = 0 play an important role, allowing to keep low the degrees of
the polynomials that appear during the computations. Moreover, they observed that for a
system of quadratic equations coming from the public key of an HFE scheme, the algorithm
terminates at a lesser degree than for a random system. Also, the degree at which it ends
does not depend on the number of variables n, it only depends on the degree D of the secret
polynomial. Therefore, for a fixed D and q = 2 they claimed that the attack is polynomial
in n.
A key concept in the analysis of the complexity of the algebraic attack is the degree of
regularity introduced in [2]. We present here a definition of this concept given in [22].
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Definition 4.2. Let P = {p1, ..., pm} be a set of quadratic polynomials in k [x1, ..., xn] and






where gi ∈ k [x1, ..., xn]. For each integer d ≥ 1, let Vd be the set of elements of I which are





gipi ∈ I| deg(gipi) = d
}
.
Notice that an element of Vd could have degree smaller than d. We say that a degree fall
occurs when there exists an element g ∈ Vd with degree smaller than d. Such an element is





The degree of regularity of the set P = {p1, ..., pm} is the smallest d at which a degree fall
occurs.
Most of the algorithms that perform the algebraic attack over a system {p1 = 0, · · · , pn = 0}
search at each step of the computations for elements of the ideal I =< p1, ..., pm >. There
exists experimental evidence that such algorithms will terminate at or shortly after the
degree of regularity appears. Moreover, if the system comes from the public key of an HFE
scheme, the experiments show that the degree of regularity is close to logqD. However, the
only known explicit bound comes from the work of Ding and Hodges [17]. They showed that







Notice that this bound does not depend on the number of variables n. Therefore, they
conclude that
1. if q and D are fixed, the algebraic attack is polynomial in n;
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Notice that this confirms the experimental results from Faugère and Joux [25] for q = 2. On
the other hand, if q is of size O (n) the possibility that the algebraic attack is exponential in
n remains open. However, the complexity of the decryption process involves the parameter
q and then a too large q cannot be used.
In characteristic 2, say q = 2l, it is always possible to see a set of m quadratic equations
in n variables over Fq as a set of ml quadratic equations in nl variables over F2, via the
standard isomorphism between Fq and F
l
2. Therefore the algebraic attack is still effective
in this case. For this reason, some authors have suggested to use a high odd characteristic,
making the field equations useless and thus the algebraic attack less effective.
4.4 Kipnis-Shamir MinRank attack (KS attack)
The bound D on the degree of the core polynomial F of the HFE scheme implies that the




, i.e., this matrix
has the form B 0
0 0
 ,
where B is an r × r matrix.
In 1999 Kipnis and Shamir [32] proposed a key-recovery attack against HFE that takes
advantage of the low rank of this matrix. The KS attack exploits the structure behind the
construction of HFE and it links the cryptanalysis of HFE with a linear algebra problem
known as the MinRank Problem.
The MinRank Problem. Let k be a finite field and consider m matrices M1, · · · ,Mm
over k of size n × n. Given an integer r ≤ n, the problem is to find, if they exist, scalars
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This is in general an NP-hard problem [7]. However for small r, which is the case in HFE,
this problem is not too hard. There exist two algebraic ways to attack this problem: the
Kipnis-Shamir and the Minors Modelings.
Kipnis-Shamir Modeling. Kipnis and Shamir [32] proposed to bind the MinRank Problem
to the problem of solving an algebraic quadratic system of equations. They noted that, if
the matrix M = λ1M1 + · · ·+ λtMm has rank at most r, its left kernel {~x ∈ kn : ~xM = 0}
has at least n− r linearly independent vectors. Therefore, solving the MinRank problem is
equivalent to solving the system coming from vanishing the entries of the matrix












This yields an overdetermined quadratic system with n(n− r) equations and r(n− r) +m
variables. The authors in [32] proposed a method for solving this system which they called
relinearization. Later on, in [8], it was shown that this method can be seen as a special case
of the XL algorithm. In fact, the XL algorithm can be viewed as a redundant variant of the
Gröbner basis algorithm F4 [1]. Therefore, this system is usually solved using Gröbner basis
tools as F4.
Minors Modeling. Courtois proposed another way to solve the MinRank Problem [9]. Since
the matrix λ1M1 + · · ·+ λtMm has rank at most r, all its minors of order (r + 1)× (r + 1)





polynomial equations in the m variables
λi. Notice that this system has many more equations than the system coming from the
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Kipnis-Shamir Modeling, but the equations have degree r+1. In practice, it seems that this
approach is equivalent to the Kipnis-Shamir Modeling.
Now we discuss the KS attack. Let k be a finite field of size q and let K be a degree n
extension field of k. Consider the standard k-linear isomorphism ϕ : K → kn, and let S,
T : kn → kn be two invertible affine transformations. We recall that the HFE public key is
P = T ◦ ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S,
where F is an HFE polynomial with bound D.
We only consider the case q odd. If q is even the attack is slightly different. For simplicity
in the exposition, we suppose that S and T are linear transformations. The idea of the KS
attack is to lift the public key back to the big field K. More precisely, let P ∗ : K → K be
the map
P ∗ = ϕ−1 ◦ P ◦ ϕ =
(




ϕ−1 ◦ S ◦ ϕ
)
.
Let S∗ = ϕ−1 ◦ S ◦ ϕ and T ∗ = ϕ−1 ◦ T ◦ ϕ. We then have that
P ∗ = T ∗ ◦ F ◦ S∗,
and thus
(4.1) T ∗−1 ◦ P ∗ = F ◦ S∗.
Equation (4.1) is the starting point for finding T ∗−1 and S∗, and hence T and S. Since S is






Let A be the matrix associated to the quadratic part of F and let A∗ be the matrix associated
to the quadratic part of P ∗. Theorem 2.10 provides a formula for finding A∗. From Equation
(4.1), we will get a key relation between the matrices A and A∗. First, we give the explicit
form of the matrices associated to T ∗−1 ◦ P ∗ and F ◦ S∗.
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Since Rank(ΛAΛt) = Rank(A) ≤ r, the matrix ΛAΛt has low rank as well. This is one of
the keys of the attack.
Now we look at the matrix associated to T ∗−1 ◦ P ∗. Notice that T ∗−1 = (T−1)∗, and so,






Hence, we have that







The matrix associated to P ∗(X)q
i
is closely related to the matrix A∗ associated to P ∗(X).
The relation is given by the map Γ in Definition 4.4.
Definition 4.4. For l = 0, · · · , n−1 and B = (bi,j)n−1i,j=0 ∈Mn×n(K), let Γl(B) ∈Mn×n(K)




where i− l and j − l are taken modulo n.

























An attacker can compute the matrices Γl(A
∗) since they come from the public key. Let us
suppose the attacker finds a solution for the MinRank problem (**), say t′0, · · · , t′n−1. Even
if these are not the original coefficients of T ∗−1, she can construct an equivalent private
key (equivalent keys are studied in [47, 45, 46]). Therefore, without loss of generality, we
suppose that she finds the original coefficients t0, · · · , tn−1 of T ∗−1. Thus, she can compute
the map T ∗−1 and then T .








We assume, without loss of generality, that the rank of A is exactly r. Since the last n− r
rows of A are zero, then the last n − r rows of AΛt are also zero. This gives an attacker
(n−r)n q-weight one equations on the n coefficients si of S∗ (each entry of Λ−1 is a Frobenius
power of some si). Since the matrix Ã also has rank r, only (n− r)r of these equations are
not redundant. Each q-weight one equation leads to n linear equations on new n variables
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over the small field k. Hence, she has n(n − r)r linear equations in n2 variables to find S∗
and then S.
Even if the attacker does not find the original private key, she finds transformations
S ′ and T ′, and a polynomial F ′ such that the public key can also be obtained as P =
T ′ ◦ ϕ ◦ F ′ ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S ′. Therefore she can use this equivalent private key to find pre-images
of a given ciphertext. This concludes the KS attack.
The main part of the KS attack, with respect to complexity, is solving the MinRank
problem. This leads to a highly everdetermined system (either Kipnis-Shamir or Minors
Modeling). Based on this, the authors of the KS attack conjectured that their attack was
polynomial in the number of variables and thus effective. However, they did not perform
experiments. Later on Ding et al. [30] reviewed the KS attack and they concluded from
their experiments that this attack is not as effective as originally claimed. Since then, the
attack was considered theoretical. However, recently Faugère et al. [4] improved the KS
attack and were able to break HFE and its generalization Multi-HFE. They restated the
attack with the matrices coming from the public key whose coefficients are in the small field
k, in contrast to the original attack which uses matrices with coefficients in the big field K.
This makes the improved KS attack significantly faster than the original KS attack.
In practice, the only difference between the original KS attack and the improved KS
attack from [4], is that the improved one uses the public key matrices. In our experiments
in Chapter 7 we use the improved KS attack to test our new scheme.
4.5 Some variants of HFE
There have been many attempts to build secure and efficient variants of HFE for both
signature and encryption schemes. Here we discuss some of these encryption variants and
their security.
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The Minus and Plus methods discussed in Section 3.3 can be applied to HFE in a similar
way to MI. Initially it was thought that the Minus method prevents the KS attack. However,
just like HFE, this variant is vulnerable to the improved KS attack discussed in the Section
4.4 with a small modification to make it suitable for this variant [4].
One of the latest variants of HFE, namely Multi-HFE [29], proposes to use as core map
a system of multivariate polynomials over an extension field instead of a single polynomial
as in HFE. In what follows we describe a Multi-HFE scheme with an embedding.
Let k be a finite field of odd characteristic and size q. Select a degree n irreducible
polynomial g (y) ∈ k [y] and let K = k [y] /(g (y)) be a degree n extension field of k. Consider
the standard k-linear isomorphism ϕ : K → kn. Fix an integer N > 1 and choose a map
~F : KN → KN of the form
~F (X1, · · · , XN) = (F1 (X1, · · · , XN) , · · · , FN (X1, · · · , XN)) ,
where each Fl is a randomly chosen quadratic polynomial in K[X1, · · · , XN ] with the shape







Now randomly choose two invertible affine transformations S and T over knN and for a small
positive integer r < n consider the affine embedding π : knN−r → knN . The public key of
Multi-HFE is then the map P : knN−r → knN given by
P = T ◦ (ϕ× · · · × ϕ) ◦ ~F ◦
(
ϕ−1 × · · · × ϕ−1
)
◦ S ◦ π.
Notice that N = 1 and r = 0 correspond to the basic HFE scheme. The parameter N must
be small because the decryption requires to invert the map ~F . The authors recommended to
use N = 3. They proposed to use a base field of high characteristic in order to prevent the
algebraic attack. Also, they used an embedding with the intention of destroying the hidden
field structure which is exploited by the KS attack. However, in [4] the authors were able to
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generalize the KS attack and then break a more general version of Multi-HFE. This version
uses more general core polynomials Fl with the shape



















where al,i,u,j,v, bl,i,u, cl ∈ K, and d is a fixed positive integer. The bound d cannot be too
large because the inversion of the map ~F would be very slow. Therefore, the total degree of
each polynomial Fl must be small.
4.6 The history of HFE
In this section we carry out a brief historical review of the HFE scheme. After breaking the
MI scheme in [38], Patarin proposed the generalization HFE [39]. In the extended version
of [39] Patarin left two challenges. Challenge 1 is an instance of an HFE encryption scheme
with parameters q = 2, n = 80 and D = 96. Challenge 2 is an instance of an HFE signature
scheme with parameters q = 16, n = 36 and D = 4352, where 4 polynomials are not given
public. Since then, several variants and attacks related to HFE have emerged.
In 1999 Kipnis and Shamir [32] proposed a key-recovery attack over HFE. They linked
the cryptanalysis of HFE with a known linear algebra problem called the MinRank Problem,
and they introduced an algebraic method to solve the derived MinRank Problem. The last
step of this method consists of solving a highly overdetermined system of quadratic equations
over a finite field. With this argument, they claimed that their attack was polynomial in
the number of variables and thus effective. However, they did not perform any experiments.
In 2001 Nicolas Courtois [9] proposed some new attacks on HFE and he was able to break
the HFE challenge 1 with one of these atacks in about 262 operations . Also, he proposed
another way (minors modeling) to solve the MinRank Problem derived from the KS attack.
In 2002 Christopher Wolf [44] presented a review of HFE. He surveyed the main variants,
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attacks and applications of HFE at that moment. Moreover, he proposed some new HFE
variants.
The HFE challenge 1 was broken in 2003 by Faugère and Joux by means of the Gröbner
basis algorithm F5 [25]. Based on their experiments, they concluded that the cryptanalysis
of HFE can be performed in polynomial time in the case q = 2.
In 2004 Courtois [10] introduced three algebraic attacks over GF (2k) using modifications
of the XL algorithm. He claimed that the best attack by means of these algorithms over
the HFE challenge 2 takes about 263 operations. On the other hand, in [2] the authors
introduced a key concept for the study of the complexity of the algebraic attack on HFE:
the degree of regularity (see Definition 4.2).
In 2005 Wolf and Preneel investigated the existence of equivalent keys in multivariate
quadratic schemes like HFE, MI and some variations [47, 45]. The existence of equivalent
keys was first reported by Kipnis and Shamir [32] as isomorphic keys. Two private keys are
equivalent if they compose into the same public key. The authors in [45] proved that there
exist nq2n(qn − 1)2 equivalent keys for an HFE scheme and they showed that equivalent
keys can be used to reduce the implementations memory using a special equivalent key.
Moreover, they stated that equivalent keys could be applied to cryptanalysis since they
allow us to concentrate on special forms of the private key. In particular they showed that
using affine transformations rather than linear does not strengthen the security of an HFE
scheme. Later on the same authors did an additional study on equivalent keys in [46].
In 2006 Granboulan, Joux and Stern [28] derived heuristic asymptotic bounds on the
degree of regularity in the case q = 2. Based on these bounds they concluded that inverting
HFE is quasi-polynomial in the case q = 2. Their approach was to bind the degree of
regularity of an HFE scheme with the degree of regularity of a lifted system over an extension
field. In 2010 Dubois and Gama [22] gave a rigorous mathematical foundation for the ideas
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in [28], and they derived an algorithm to compute a bound on the degree of regularity of an
HFE scheme for a general q.
The original HFE was proposed by Patarin over GF (2). However, in 2008 Ding, Schmidt
and Werner proposed an odd characteristic HFE scheme with an embedding modifier [18].
They noticed that for high odd characteristic, the field equations are not useful to reduce
the degree of the polynomials used in the Gröbner basis computations and therefore the
algebraic attack does not work in this case. The embedding modifier seeks to avoid the KS
MinRank attack. They proposed an example for a practical application over GF (11) and
gave a challenge problem over GF (7).
In 2008 Ding et al. [30] reviewed the KS attack and concluded from their experiments
that the attack is not as effective as originally claimed.
Also in 2008 the authors in [29] proposed a multivariate version of HFE (Multi-HFE).
Instead of using a single polynomial as core map, they proposed to use a system of multi-
variate polynomials over an extension field. In addition, they used odd characteristic and
an embedding modifier for this proposal. They suggested a practical implementation where
the core map is a system of 3 polynomials in 3 variables over GF (31).
In 2010 Charles Bouilliaguet et al. exhibited a family of weak keys of HFE [5]. In
particular, if the coefficients of the core polynomial map are chosen in the base field, they
showed a key-recovery attack over the associated HFE scheme, and they emphasized that
this attack is effective even if the core polynomial has high degree.
In 2011 Ding and Hodges [17] derived the first explicit bound on the degree of regularity
and concluded that, if q and D are fixed, the algebraic attack is polynomial in the number
of variables n.
In 2012 the authors in [4] improved and generalized the KS MinRank attack and were
able to break the challenges from [18] and from the generalization Multi-HFE [29].
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Chapter 5
The Zhuang-Zi algorithm (ZZ algorithm)
The problem of solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations over a finite field
is a central problem in cryptanalysis. The security of an MKP scheme is based on the
difficulty of solving a system of quadratic equations over a finite field. Moreover, there exist
algebraic attacks against some symmetric schemes like AES [11]. The main tools for solving
a multivariate system over a finite field come from the family of XL algorithms [8, 14, 36, 37]
and Gröbner basis algorithms [6, 24].
In 2006 Ding et al. introduced a new algorithm for solving a system of multivariate
polynomial equations over a finite field which they called the Zhuang-Zi algorithm [16].
To construct the new multivariate trapdoor function in the next chapter, we introduce a
reduction method inspired by the way in which ZZ works.
The idea of ZZ is to lift the multivariate system to a univariate polynomial F over an
extension field of the original field, and then try to derive a low degree polynomial Ψ by
means of a special reduction method that involves the Frobenius powers of F . Due to
the special form of the reduction process, the roots of F are also roots of the low degree
polynomial Ψ. The roots of Ψ can be found efficiently by means of Berlekamp’s algorithm.
We begin by describing ZZ and showing a step-by-step trivial example. Then we show
nontrivial examples where ZZ works but the best Gröbner basis algorithms do not.
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5.1 Description of ZZ
Let k be a finite field of size q and let K be a degree n extension of k. Consider the standard
k-linear isomorphism ϕ : K → kn. Suppose that we want to solve the system of multivariate
equations
f1(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, · · · , fn(x1, . . . , xn) = 0,
where fi(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ k[x1, · · · , xn].
Let f : kn → kn be the map defined by f = (f1, · · · , fn). Consider the lifting F : K → K
defined by
F = ϕ−1 ◦ f ◦ ϕ.






. The ZZ algorithm constantly uses the following procedure with name
Reduce-by-degree.






. Create a sequence M with the monomials of all the elements in S and
sort M in decreasing order with respect to the degree. Let |M | be the size of M . For each
element of S, extract its coefficients with respect to M and create a row vector in K |M | with
them in the order given by M . Then construct the Macaulay matrix associated to S, i.e., the
n× |M | matrix whose rows are the vectors we just described. Use Gaussian elimination to
reduce the Macaulay matrix. With the nonzero rows of the matrix in echelon form produce
and return a new set of basis polynomials, which we will also call S. Abusing the notation,
write S = {S0, · · · , St−1}, with t ≤ l and sort S such that St−1 is the polynomial of lowest
degree in S.
Before stating the ZZ algorithm, we illustrate how the procedure Reduce-by-degree works.
Let k = GF (3), and for the irreducible polynomial g(y) = y2 + 2y + 2 ∈ k[y] consider the
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degree n extension field K = k[y]/(g(y)). We choose a generator b ∈ K of the multiplicative
group of K such that g(b) = 0. Let S be the set in K[X] consisting of the polynomials
S1(X) = bX
7 + b5X5 + b2X4 + b3X + b,
S2(X) = b
3X7 + bX5 +X3 + b5X2 + b2,
S3(X) = X
7 + b2X4 +X3 + b5X2 + b3X + b3.
The sequence with the monomials of all the elements in S in decreasing order with respect
to the degree is M = (X7, X5, X4, X3, X2, X1, X0). Thus, the Macaulay matrix associated
to S is
X7 X5 X4 X3 X2 X1 X0
b b5 b2 0 0 b3 b
b3 b 0 1 b5 0 b2
1 0 b2 1 b5 b3 b3
 .
The echelon form of this matrix is
X7 X5 X4 X3 X2 X1 X0
1 0 b2 1 b5 b3 b3
0 1 1 1 b5 b b5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 .
Therefore, Reduce-by-degree(S) is the set with the two polynomials
S1(X) = X
7 + b2X4 +X3 + b5X2 + b3X + b3,
S2(X) = X
5 +X4 +X3 + b5X2 + bX + b5.
We now continue with the exposition of the ZZ algorithm. The ZZ algorithm has as input the
polynomials f1, · · · , fn ∈ k[x1, · · · , xn] and a positive integer D0 such that every univariate
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polynomial equation with degree less than or equal to D0 can be solved efficiently using
a chosen algorithm, such as Berlekamp’s algorithm. The output of the algorithm is the
set of the solutions in kn for the system {f1 = 0, · · · , fn = 0}. The algorithm performs the
following steps.
1. Set f = (f1, · · · , fn) and F = ϕ−1 ◦ f ◦ ϕ. If deg (F ) ≤ D0, go to Step 4, otherwise
let F0, F1, · · · , Fn−1 be the Frobenius powers of F . If deg (Fi) ≤ D0 for some i ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n− 1}, go to Step 4, otherwise go to the next step.
2. Let S be the set consisting of the Frobenius powers of F . Compute Reduce-by-degree(S)
to produce a new set S = {S0, · · · , St−1}. If deg (St−1) ≤ D0, go to the Step 4, otherwise
go to the next step.









Add these polynomials to S. Compute Reduce-by-degree(S), and abusing the notation
again, use t to denote the size of this new S. If deg (St−1) ≤ D0, go to the Step 4,
otherwise repeat this step.
4. At this step there exists a polynomial Ψ of degree less than or equal to D0. Apply the
chosen algorithm to find the set Z of roots of this polynomial Ψ. The set Z contains
the roots of F . The solutions of the system {f1 = 0, · · · , fn = 0} correspond to the
roots of F by means of the standard isomorphism ϕ : K → kn.
5.2 Toy example
We consider the field with four elements k = GF (2)(a), where a2 + a+ 1 = 0. We select the
irreducible polynomial g(y) = y2 + y + a2 ∈ k[y] to generate the extension field of degree
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two K = k[y]/(g(y)). We choose a generator b ∈ K of the multiplicative group of K such
that g(b) = 0. The system to be solved consists of the following two quadratic equations in
two variables with coefficients in k:
f1(x1, x2) = ax
2
1 + a
2x1x2 + a = 0,
f2(x1, x2) = ax
2
1 + a
2x22 + ax2 + a
2 = 0.
We show how to lift the map f = (f1, f2) to the map F = ϕ
−1 ◦ f ◦ ϕ by means of the































One basis for K over k is (θ1, θ2) = (1, b), and thus the isomorphism ϕ and its inverse can































c = (θ1, θ2)(c1, c2)
t.
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So we have that













=bX8 + b5X5 + b11X4 + b13X2 + b11X + b7.
Since this is a toy example, the polynomial F can be factorized directly to get
F (X) = (X + b9)2(X6 + b3X4 + b4X3 + b7X2 + b7X + b3),
and so we observe that the unique root of F is X = b9, since it is easy to verify that the
second factor is irreducible over K using Magma [34]. In order to show how the ZZ algorithm
works, we set D0 = 2, i.e., we will search for a degree two polynomial Ψ. Notice that here
q = 2 and n = 4 and therefore the Frobenius powers of F are
F0(X) = F (X) = bX
8 + b5X5 + b11X4 + b13X2 + b11X + b7,
F1(X) = F
4(X) = b7X8 + b5X5 + b14X4 + b4X2 + b14X + b13.
Let S = {F0, F1} and apply Reduce-by-degree(S) to get the polynomials
S0(X) = X
8 + b11X4 + b12X2 + b11X + b6,
S1(X) = X
5 + b10X4 + b10X.
Because we have not yet reached a degree two polynomial, we multiply both S0(X) and
S1(X) by X and X
4 to obtain four polynomials that we add to S. After applying Reduce-
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by-degree(S) we obtain the new set S with polynomials
S0(X) = X
12 + b4X3 + b12X2 +X + 1,
S1(X) = X
9 + bX3 + b2X2 + b10X + b2,
S2(X) = X
8 + b3X3 + b5X2 + b12X + b10,
S3(X) = X
6 + b12X3 + bX2 + b6X + b,
S4(X) = X
5 + b2X3 + b13X2 + b11X + b6,
S5(X) = X
4 + b7X3 + b3X2 + b4X + b11.
Again, we still do not have in S a degree two polynomial and thus we multiply each Si(X)
by X and X4. The derived set of polynomials are added to S to obtain a set with eighteen
polynomials. Reduce-by-degree(S) produces the set of eleven polynomials
S0(X) = X
13 + b12X + b4,
S1(X) = X
12 + b11X + b11,
S2(X) = X
10 + b11X + b10,
S3(X) = X
9 + b9X + b2,
S4(X) = X
8 + b8X + b7,
S5(X) = X
7 +X + b,
S6(X) = X






3 + b11X + b14,
S10(X) = X
2 + b14X + b13.
The algorithm terminates since it has found the degree two polynomial Ψ = X2 +b14X+b13.
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The set of roots of Ψ is {b4, b9}. However, only b9 is root of F . Since b9 = a2 + a2b, the
solution of the system {f1 = 0, f2 = 0} is ϕ(b9) = (a2, a2).
5.3 Nontrivial examples
The authors of ZZ showed that there exist cases of multivariate systems where their algorithm
works and the best Gröbner basis algorithms, like F4 algorithm, do not. Such nontrivial
examples can be generated because the complexity for finding a Gröbner basis for n random
quadratic polynomials in n variables is exponential in n. For example, if k = GF (23), and
K is a degree n extension of k, consider the low degree polynomial






2 + a7X + a8,
where the coefficients ai are randomly chosen from the small field k. The polynomial F has
q-weight two. Therefore Theorem 2.10 ensures that the associated multivariate set derived
from the composition ϕ ◦ F ◦ ϕ−1(x1, · · · , xn) is a set of quadratic polynomials. The low
degree allow us to easily factor the polynomial F over K using Berlekamp’s algorithm,
regardless of the value of n. Because the complexity of the Gröbner basis algorithms is
exponential in n, for large values of n these algorithms fail.
The previous example only uses the first step of ZZ and Berlekamp’s algorithm. The
authors of ZZ showed another nontrivial example where the Magma implementation of F4
does not succeed with their PC (1.73 GHz, 1 GB of RAM) and ZZ needs to use at least
once the reduction procedure Reduce-by-degree to succeed. Take k = GF (2)(a), where
a2 + a+ 1 = 0, and define K = k[y]/(g(y)), where g(y) ∈ k[y] is the irreducible polynomial
g(y) = y12 + y11 + ay10 + ay9 + y8 + y7 + y5 + a2y4 + ay3 + a2y2 + ay + a.
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Let F (X) ∈ K[X] be the polynomial
F (X) = a2X17664 +X5440 + aX5376 +X4416 + aX4096 + aX1360
+X1344 +X1280 + a2X1024 + a2X336 + aX320 + a2X276
+X85 + aX84 + aX64 + aX21 +X20 + a.
The high degree of F prevents us to solve the equation F (X) = 0 directly by Berlekamp’s
algorithm. On the other hand, the ZZ algorithm produces the low degree polynomial
Ψ = X276 + aX85 + a2X84 + a2X64 + a2X21 + aX20 + a.
After factoring the polynomial Ψ, using Berlekamp’s algorithm, we obtain the solutions
X = 1 and X = a of the equation F (X) = 0.
The ZZ algorithm can be used to perform the algebraic attack over a multivariate public
key scheme like HFE. Unfortunately, the experiments show that ZZ is not very effective in
this task. The last example was constructed “artificially”, using the Step 3 of ZZ in reverse
order. However, ZZ can be combined with other algorithms that perform the algebraic
attack, like F4 or XL, to enhance them.
Finally, in [20] Ding and Schmidt introduced a variant of ZZ called Mutant Zhuang-
Zi algorithm which is based on Ding’s mutant concept (see Definition 4.2). This variant
improves ZZ in a lot of cases.
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Chapter 6
New candidates for multivariate trapdoor functions
The weakness of the HFE cryptosystem lies on the use of a low degree core polynomial
F . This polynomial is used for both encryption and decryption. The process of decryption
involves inverting the map F (search of pre-images). Therefore, if we take a polynomial of
high degree the decryption could be impossible, and if otherwise we take a polynomial of
low degree the attacks mentioned in Chapter 4 would work.
To overcome this weakness we developed a reduction method for building pairs of HFE
polynomials of very high degree, and such that the map constructed with such a pair is
easy to invert, using a low degree polynomial derived from a special reduction via q-weight
three polynomials. This low degree polynomial is easy to invert by means of Berlekamp’s
algorithm. In this way, we are able to use two HFE polynomials of high degree to construct
a new candidate for a trapdoor function, and a polynomial of small degree as the trapdoor
used to invert such trapdoor function.
6.1 The Reduction method
Let us briefly review the main ideas of the ZZ algorithm (Section 5.1) for solving a system
of polynomials equations {f1 = 0, · · · , fn = 0} in n variables over a finite field k of size q.
Let K be a degree n extension field of k. Let A be an algorithm that solves univariate
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polynomial equations over the field K, such as Berlekamp’s algorithm. Let D0 be a positive
integer such that every univariate polynomial equation with degree at most D0 can be solved
efficiently using the algorithm A. The first step of ZZ is lifting the system of equations to
a polynomial F over K. The goal of ZZ is to obtain a univariate polynomial Ψ with degree
at most D0 and whose roots contain the roots of F . If such a polynomial Ψ can be found,
then its roots are obtained using the algorithm A and so ZZ terminates. If deg (F ) ≤ D0,
then Ψ = F and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise ZZ computes the set of Frobenius
powers of F , say S = {F0, F1, · · · , Fn−1}. If there exists in S a polynomial Ψ of degree at
most D0 the algorithm terminates, otherwise ZZ applies the procedure Reduce-by-degree to
the set S to produce a new set S = {S0, · · · , St−1} and looks for a polynomial Ψ of degree
at most D0 in this new set S. If there exists such polynomial Ψ the algorithm terminates,
otherwise ZZ multiplies each element Si by all the monomials X
qj , j = 0, · · · , n − 1, and
appends the polynomials Xq
j
Si to the set S, to obtain a new set which we also call S.
Next, ZZ applies the procedure Reduce-by-degree to S and looks for a polynomial Ψ of
degree less than or equal to D0 in the new set S. If there exists such polynomial Ψ the
algorithm terminates, otherwise the process is repeated (multiplying by the monomials Xq
j
)
with the set of polynomials S derived from Reduce-by-degree until finding a polynomial Ψ
of degree at most D0. Clearly, the roots of F are also roots of Ψ. The solutions of the system
{f1 = 0, · · · , fn = 0} correspond to the roots of F by means of the standard isomorphism
ϕ : K → kn.
In this work we developed a method to reduce pairs of high degree HFE polynomials with
some similar ideas to those of ZZ. Unlike ZZ, here we start with two HFE polynomials F
and F̃ with unknown coefficients. As it occurs in ZZ, we look for a low degree polynomial
Ψ that involves the Frobenius powers of these polynomials. One difference is that here the
coefficients of these polynomials are to be determined. Moreover, we only multiply by the
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monomials X and Xq and the reduction process is not done by means of the procedure
Reduce-by-degree. More precisely, let F : K → K and F̃ : K → K be two high degree HFE



















where the coefficients aij, bi, c, ãij, b̃i, c̃ ∈ K are to be determined. Next, let F0, F1, · · · , Fn−1
be the Frobenius powers of F and let F̃0, F̃1, · · · , F̃n−1 be the Frobenius powers of F̃ , i.e.,
Fi(X) = [F (X)]




, for i = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1.
As in ZZ, let A be an algorithm that solves univariate polynomial equations over the field
K. Let D0 be a positive integer such that every univariate polynomial equation with degree
at most D0 can be solved efficiently using the algorithm A.
The key part of this method is to construct a polynomial Ψ of the form
Ψ =X
(





αn+1F0 + · · ·+ α2nFn−1 + βn+1F̃0 + · · ·+ β2nF̃n−1
)
,
such that deg(Ψ) ≤ D0. Notice that Ψ is a q-weight three polynomial .
To accomplish this, we need to determine the coefficients of F and F̃ , also the scalars
αi and βi, in such a way that the coefficients of the terms in Ψ of degree greater than D0
are equal to zero. We derive a system of equations from these vanishing coefficients in Ψ of
degree higher than D0. This yields a system of equations of the form
g1(z1, z2, · · · , zN) = 0, · · · , gt(z1, z2, · · · , zN) = 0,
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where the variables z1, z2, · · · , zN are the coefficients of F and F̃ , together with the scalars













+ 4n = n2 + 5n+ 2 if q = 2.
The number t of equations of this system depends on how small we want the degree
bound D0 to be. More precisely, t is the number of different terms in Ψ with degree higher
than D0. To invert the trapdoor function, which we will describe in Section 6.4, using the
polynomial Ψ, we require that the polynomial Ψ has degree at most D0.
If we write each variable zj in terms of the basis {1, y, · · · , yn−1}, we obtain a system of
quadratic equations. More precisely, each variable zj in this system can be written in the
form
(6.1) zj = u1j + u2jy + · · ·+ unjyn−1,




j = u1j + u2jy
qi + · · ·+ unjy(n−1)q
i
.
After writing each power ym as a linear combination of the elements of the basis 1, y, · · · , yn−1
with coefficients in k, and group like terms, we get that
(6.3) zq
i
j = h1j (u1j, · · · , unj) + h2j (u1j, · · · , unj) y2 + · · ·+ hnj (u1j, · · · , unj) yn−1,
where each hij is a linear function with coefficients in k.
We now write each variable of the system {g1 = 0, · · · , gt = 0} in the form (6.1), and
proceed like in (6.2) and (6.3). Comparing the coefficients of the elements of the basis
{1, y, y2, · · · , yn−1} we obtain a system of nt quadratic equations in nN variables over k.
These equations are in fact bilinear, i.e., each term of these equations has the product of a
variable that comes from the coefficients and a variable that comes from the scalars. Thus,
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if we randomly fix the variables associated to the scalars we obtain a sparse linear system
coming only from the coefficients of F and F̃ . Due to its construction, this linear system
has more variables than equations, i.e., nt < nN , and hence we can always get nontrivial
solutions for it. We then randomly choose one of those solutions to build the high degree
polynomials F and F̃ and the reduced polynomial Ψ of degree less than or equal to D0, as
explained above.
One could be tempted to try something different and randomly choose the variables
coming from the coefficients of F and F̃ , and then try to solve the linear system for the
variables coming from the scalars, with the purpose of having generic core polynomials F
and F̃ . However, this approach leads to a linear system with more equations than variables,
and thus, in general this system has no nontrivial solutions.
Remark 6.1. Our first attempt was to consider a single polynomial F and look for a low
degree polynomial Ψ of the form
Ψ = X (α1F0 + · · ·+ αnFn−1)
+Xq (αn+1F0 + · · ·+ α2nFn−1)
+Xq
2
(α2n+1F0 + · · ·+ α3nFn−1) .
The problem with this attempt was that we got a linear system with more equations than
variables and then we had difficulties finding solutions for it. For some instances we were
able to find solutions for this linear system, but these solutions produced a function F with
a low degree K-linear combination of its Frobenius powers. Therefore, F cannot be used to
build a multivariate trapdoor function because the KS attack would work against it.
6.2 Complexity of the reduction method and dimension of the solution space
If we take the coefficients of the core polynomials F and F̃ in the small field k, the reduction
method is very fast. However, as we pointed out in Section 4.6, this would lead to weak
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keys of the associated encryption scheme we will explain in the next chapter. This problem
occurs even if the core map polynomials have high degree. Therefore we always consider the
coefficients of F and F̃ in the extension field K.
Even with the coefficients in the big field K, the described method leads to a sparse linear
system over the small field k with more variables than equations. This system has about n3





2 ≤ ω ≤ 3 is a constant that depends on the elimination algorithm used to solve the sparse
linear system.
On the other hand, after we choose the 4n scalars αi and βi in the system of equations
{gi(z1, z2, · · · , zN) = 0 : i = 1, · · · , t}, we get a new system over the big field K with t equa-
tions and N − 4n variables (the coefficients of F and F̃ ). Therefore, in this new system the
number of variables exceeds the number of equations by (N − 4n)− t. Hence the final linear
system over the small field k has at least n ((N − 4n)− t) free variables. Then, we have
at least qn((N−4n)−t) > qn possible choices for the coefficients of the polynomials F and F̃ .
Thus, if we choose large parameters q and n, and if we randomly choose a solution from the
solution space, it is infeasible for anyone to guess correctly the polynomials we will use. The
large dimension of the solution space also ensures that there are sufficiently many choices
for the core map.
6.3 How to build the trapdoor function
For building a new candidate for multivariate trapdoor function, we make use of a map of




: K → K×K, in which F and F̃ have been constructed by the method
described in Section 6.1. We select two invertible affine transformations S : kn → kn and
T : k2n → k2n. Similar to HFE, the multivariate trapdoor function will be the composition
from kn to k2n given by P = T ◦ (ϕ× ϕ) ◦G ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S (see Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1: New candidate for multivariate trapdoor function.
In order to consider the new and improved version of the MinRank KS attack from [4]
against the new trapdoor function P , we would like to point out that P can be viewed
as the public key of a Multi-HFE scheme with N = 2, and without the affine embedding
π (see Section 4.5 for notation). To see this, suppose without loss of generality that S =
(s1 (x1, · · · , xn) , · · · , sn (x1, · · · , xn)) is an invertible linear transformation. Consider the
invertible linear transformation S ′ : k2n → k2n given by
S ′ (x1, · · · , x2n) = (s1 (x1, · · · , xn) , · · · , sn (x1, · · · , xn) , xn+1, · · · , x2n) .
Define F1, F2 : K ×K → K ×K by F1 (X1, X2) = F (X1) and F2 (X1, X2) = F̃ (X1). The
components of the trapdoor function P are the same components of the Multi-HFE instance




◦ S ′ (x1, · · · , x2n) .
The main difference is that here the polynomials F1 and F2 have high total degree, while
for the original Multi-HFE scheme it is not possible to use high total degree polynomials
because the decryption process would be inefficient, if not impossible.
6.4 How to invert the trapdoor function
The crucial part to invert the trapdoor function P is the inversion of the core map G =
(F, F̃ ), since the transformations S and T and the isomorphism ϕ are easy to invert. In
what follows we explain how to invert G. Let F0, · · · , Fn−1 be the Frobenius powers of F
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and let F̃0, · · · , F̃n−1 be the Frobenius powers of F̃ . By the construction of F and F̃ , there









has degree at most D0.
Proposition 6.2. Let (Y1, Y2) be an element in Im G ⊆ K ×K. Then the set of preimages


























First, notice that F ′ (X0) = 0 and F̃
′ (X0) = 0. Therefore g (X0) = 0. Secondly, since the
Frobenius powers are linear transformations, we have that F ′i = (F − Y1)q
i
= F q
i − Y q
i
1 =




i = (F̃ − Y2)q
i
= F̃ q
i − Y q
i


































































Therefore g = Ψ′ and thus we have that Ψ′(X0) = 0.
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Notice that deg(Ψ′) ≤ max(deg(Ψ), q). Therefore the polynomial Ψ′, just like Ψ, has
degree less than or equal to D0 if we take D0 ≥ q. Thus we can efficiently find the roots of
Ψ′ using the algorithm A.
Remark 6.3. The formula for computing Ψ′ in Proposition 6.2 does not involve the poly-
nomials F and F̃ , only the low degree polynomial Ψ. This is important because we want to
create an encryption scheme where, for size reasons, F and F̃ are not part of the private
key.
We now discuss the complexity of the trapdoor function inversion. The isomorphism
ϕ and its inverse ϕ−1 can be represented in matrix form (Corollary 2.9). Thus, except
for the inversion of the core map G, the computational cost of each step of the algorithm
to invert the trapdoor function P is the cost of a matrix multiplication. The degrees of
the polynomials F and F̃ , which are the components of the map G, are extremely high
(usually close to qn−1), which makes impossible to invert G directly for practical values of
n. However, as noted above, the inversion of the map G can be reduced to finding the
roots of the low degree polynomial Ψ′. This can be done efficiently using the algorithm
A (usually Berlekamp’s algorithm). Therefore, inverting the trapdoor function is a very
efficient process. In the next chapter we will show experimental data to confirm this fact.
6.5 Toy example
We present here a toy example to explain step by step the reduction method described in
Section 6.1.
Example 6.4.
For this toy example we take q = 3 and n = 2. We take k = GF (3), and we select
the irreducible polynomial g(y) = y2 + 2y + 2 ∈ k[y]. A degree n extension field of k is
57
K = k[y]/ (g(y)). We choose a generator b ∈ K of the multiplicative group of K such that





are of the form




3 + b0X + c,




3 + b̃0X + c̃,
where a11, a01, a00, b1, b0, c, ã11, ã01, ã00, b̃1, b̃0, c̃ ∈ K.

























































































Then we form the polynomial
Ψ = X
(




α3F0 + α4F1 + β3F̃0 + β4F̃1
)
.
In this example we are taking D0 = 3, i.e, we want to determine the coefficients aij, bi, c, ãij, b̃i
and c̃ and also the scalars αi, βi such that the terms of degree > 3 in Ψ vanish. In order to
do that, we have to solve the following four equations
α1a11 + α2a
3
00 + α3a01 + α4a
3
01 + β1ã11 + β2ã
3










01 + α3a00 + α4a
3
11 + β1ã01 + β2ã
3





0 + α3b0 + α4b
3
1 + β1b̃1 + β2b̃
3
0 + β3b̃0 + β4b̃
3
1 = 0.
Notice that the coefficients c and c̃ do not appear in these equations. We randomly choose
the scalars (α1, · · · , α4) = (b, b3, 2, b5) and (β1, · · · , β4) = (b2, b2, b5, 2). Then we write the
variables a00, a01, a11, b0, b1, ã00, ã01, ã11, b̃0, b̃1 in terms of the basis {1, y, · · · , yn−1}, as follows:
a00 = u1 + u2y, · · · , b̃1 = u19 + u20y.
Proceeding as explained in Section 6.1, we get the linear equations
2u8 + 2u10 + u17 + 2u18 = 0,
2u7 + u8 + u10 + u18 + u19 = 0,
2u1 + u3 + u6 + 2u12 + 2u13 + u14 + 2u15 + 2u16 = 0,
2u2 + 2u5 + 2u11 + 2u12 + 2u13 + u14 + u16 = 0,
u8 + 2u9 + 2u17 + 2u18 + 2u20 = 0,
2u7 + 2u10 + u18 + 2u19 + 2u20 = 0,
u1 + 2u2 + 2u3 + u4 + u6 + u11 + 2u13 + u14 + u15 + u16 = 0,
2u1 + 2u2 + 2u3 + 2u4 + u5 + u6 + u11 + 2u12 + 2u13 + u15 + 2u16 = 0.
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One solution of this system is
(u1, · · · , u20) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) .
This solution leads to the coefficients
(a00, a01, a11, b0, b1, ã00, ã01, ã11, b̃0, b̃1) =
(
b, b2, b3, 2, 2, b7, b2, b2
)
.
With these coefficients we get the polynomials
F = b3X6 + b2X4 + bX2 + 2X and F̃ = b7X6 + b2X3 + 2X2 + b2X.
We now use these polynomials, together the scalars αi and βi, to form the reduced polynomial
Ψ = b5X3 + b5X2 + b2X.
6.6 Big examples
In this section we present two large scale examples of the reduction method described in





described in Section 6.4.
Example 6.5.
Let q = 5 and n = 8. We take k = GF (5) and we select the irreducible polynomial
y8 + y4 + 3y2 + 4y+ 2 ∈ k[y]. A degree n extension field of k is K = k[y]/ (g(y)). We choose
a generator b ∈ K of the multiplicative group of K such that g(b) = 0. In this example we
are taking D0 = 40, i.e, we require that the terms of degree > 40 in Ψ vanish.
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Following the same procedure explained in Example 6.4, we obtain the polynomials
F (X) = b193588X156250 + b95686X93750 + b284623X81250 + b160172X78750 + b313712X78250
+ b235602X78150 + b221834X78130 + b376167X78126 + b275347X78125 + b368321X31250
+ b102411X18750 + b156633X16250 + b388585X15750 + b116832X15650 + b371543X15630
+ b146359X15626 + b286664X15625 + b388903X6250 + b77757X3750 + b138809X3250
+ b169231X3150 + b365819X3130 + b281776X3126 + b278761X3125 + b125804X1250
+ b175902X750 + b127779X650 + b161150X630 + b144579X626 + b254441X625
+ b199075X250 + b219766X150 + b64647X130 + b277102X126 + b152760X125
+ b311781X50 + b206113X30 + b172953X26 + b102994X25 + b37496X10 + b1608X6
+ b250302X5 + b25721X2 + b259503X,
F̃ (X) = b127857X156250 + b189925X93750 + b290048X81250 + b19423X78750 + b132151X78250
+ b375166X78150 + b100474X78130 + b53348X78126 + b30604X78125 + b334818X31250
+ b70571X18750 + b205616X16250 + b355953X15750 + b159663X15650 + b374321X15630
+ b276328X15626 + b374862X15625 + b15376X6250 + b351616X3750 + b63371X3250
+ b99546X3150 + b115611X3130 + b259941X3126 + b233678X3125 + b28695X1250
+ b281966X750 + b214174X650 + b362722X630 + b264275X626 + b278500X625
+ b217548X250 + b235648X150 + b47958X130 + b127955X126 + b113479X125
+ b206907X50 + b89670X30 + b355802X26 + b223357X25 + b148589X10 + b250488X6
+ b89872X5 + b62097X2 + b252872X.
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The previous polynomials were constructed using the randomly chosen scalars
(α1, · · · , α16) =
(
b18997, b269732, b62323, b292807, b75948, b205887, b68718, b277548 ,




(β1, · · · , β16) =
(
b305839, b381782, b97713, b386643, b217587, b186365, b375250, b125793 ,
b301982, b228633, b175403, b153354, b222133, b101489, b192773, b281414
)
.
The scalars αi and βi, together with the polynomials F and F̃ , lead to the reduced polynomial
Ψ = b171243X35 + b268011X31 + b15747X30 + b277951X27 + b92638X26 + b60251X15 + b215473X11
+ b294576X10 + b53530X7 + b183008X6 + b247124X3 + b218973X2.
The high degrees of F and F̃ prevent us to invert G = (F, F̃ ) directly, but we can invert G
using the low degree polynomial Ψ as explained in Section 6.4. To show how to invert G, we
randomly choose X0 = b
254095 ∈ K. Then we calculate (Y1, Y2) = G(X0) = (b374629, b234588).














= b171243X35 + b268011X31 + b15747X30 + b277951X27 + b92638X26 + b60251X15 + b215473X11
+ b294576X10 + b53530X7 + b183008X6 + b51964X5 + b247124X3 + b218973X2 + b126167X.
The set of roots of the polynomial Ψ′, found very quickly by Berlekamp’s algorithm, is
{0, b254095}. Notice that X0 is one of these roots.
62
Example 6.6.
With q = 11 and n = 25, and taking D0 = 3000, we found a pair of polynomials F and F̃
with the same degree
D = 19699465351615222189423682 = 2qn−1,
which is the highest possible degree for these polynomials.
The reduced polynomial Ψ that we found has degree 2673. Hence, inverting the core map
G = (F, F̃ ) is a simple task using Berlekamp’s algorithm to find the roots of the polynomial
Ψ′, which also has degree 2673. These polynomials are too big to be displayed here. In this
example we needed to solve a sparse linear system of size 16275× 17500.
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Chapter 7
New multivariate public key encryption schemes
In this chapter we propose an MPK cryptosystem based on the new trapdoor function
constructed in Chapter 6. We give theoretical and experimental arguments to show that, for
this cryptosystem, the encryption/decryption processes are very efficient. After performing
the main known attacks that can threaten the security of these kind of schemes –the direct
algebraic and the MinRank attacks–, we propose parameters for this new cryptosystem. We
show the values of the main features of this cryptosystem for the suggested parameters.
One drawback of our MPK encryption scheme is the generation time of the private key.
We have to deal with huge matrices to reach large values of n. On the plus side we have that
these matrices are sparse, which is an advantage in terms of efficiency. Some data about the
sparsity of these matrices and time generation of the private key appears in Appendix A.
The expensive process of computing the private key is compensated with the high level of
security obtained for the use of high degree core polynomials in this cryptosystem.
7.1 The encryption scheme
Let k be a finite field of size q. Fix a positive integer n and choose a degree n irreducible
polynomial g(y) ∈ k[y]. Consider the field extension K = k[y]/ (g(y)) and the isomorphism
ϕ : K → kn defined by ϕ (u1 + u2y + . . .+ unyn−1) = (u1, u2, . . . , un) . Let F , F̃ and Ψ be





constructed using the method described in Section
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6.1, i.e., F and F̃ are two high degree HFE polynomials and Ψ is a low degree q-weight three
polynomial which allows us to invert the map G = (F, F̃ ). Then we select two invertible
affine transformations S : kn → kn and T : k2n → k2n. The public key of the new encryption
scheme is the multivariate trapdoor function
P (x1, · · · , xn) = T ◦ (ϕ× ϕ) ◦G ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S(x1, · · · , xn).
Notice that P is a map from kn to k2n (see Figure 6.1). The private key consists of the low
degree polynomial Ψ, the transformations S and T , and the scalars α1, · · · , α2n, β1, · · · , β2n.
In summary we have for the new encryption scheme:
Public key. The public key of the new encryption scheme includes:
• The field k and its structure.
• The trapdoor function P (x1, · · · , xn) = T ◦ (ϕ× ϕ) ◦G ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S(x1, · · · , xn).
Private key. The private key of the new encryption scheme includes:
• The low degree polynomial Ψ.
• The two invertible affine transformations S and T .
• The scalars α1, · · · , α2n, β1, · · · , β2n.
Public key generation. The public key is generated by means of the reduction method





where 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3.
Private key generation. The reduction method from Section 6.1 also gives us the low
degree polynomial Ψ and the scalars α1, · · · , α2n, β1, · · · , β2n, which are part of the private
key. Now we discuss the generation of the transformations S and T . The probability of
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which is big for large n. For example, if q = 7 and n = 55 this probability is approximately
0.83. Therefore we need very few attempts to generate the transformations S and T .
Encryption. To encrypt a plaintext (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ kn we simply plug this plaintext into
the public key P = T ◦ (ϕ× ϕ) ◦G ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S to obtain the ciphertext
(y1, · · · , y2n) = P (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ k2n.
Decryption. To recover the plaintext from the ciphertext we must invert each part of P .
Similar to the decryption process in HFE, we perform the following steps:
• We first compute (w1, · · · , w2n) = T−1 (y1, · · · , y2n).
• Next we calculate (Y1, Y2) = (ϕ−1 (w1, · · · , wn) , ϕ−1 (wn+1, · · · , w2n)).




, i.e., we have to solve the equation
G (X) = (Y1, Y2). The solutions of this equation are part of the roots of the low degree
polynomial Ψ′, obtained from Ψ and (Y1, Y2) as in Proposition 6.2. Let Z be the set
Z = {X ∈ K/Ψ′ (X) = 0} .
We must now determine which elements of Z are solutions of the polynomial equation
G (X) = (Y1, Y2). In our extensive experiments we always got that only one element of
Z was a solution for this equation.
• For each solution X ∈ Z of the equation G (X) = (Y1, Y2) we compute the vector
ϕ (X) ∈ kn.
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• Finally, we apply the transformation S−1 to each vector found in the previous step and
these vectors are the candidates to be the plaintext. To determine which of these is the
original plaintext, some redundant information must be added to the plaintext1.
7.2 Toy example
This example shows how the new encryption scheme works. Set q = 3 and n = 3, and
consider the field with three elements k = GF (3). We select the irreducible polynomial
g(y) = y3+2y+1 ∈ k[y]. A degree n extension field of k is K = k[y]/ (g(y)). We can choose a
generator b ∈ K of the multiplicative group of K such that g(b) = 0, and we use this element
to write the elements of K as powers of it. Let us take D0 = 4. We now randomly choose
the scalars (α1, · · · , α6) = (b14, b23, b20, b20, b22, b14) and (β1, · · · , β6) = (b9, b16, 2, b3, b6, b20).
Then, as explained in Section 6.1, we construct the polynomials
F (X) = b24X18 + b9X12 + bX10 + b3X9 + b16X6 + b7X4 + b10X3 + b12X2 + b10X,
F̃ (X) = b9X12 + b25X10 + b17X9 + b22X6 + b7X4 + b20X3 + 2X2 + b17X,
Ψ(X) = b8X4 + b6X3 + b4X2.
We also select the invertible affine transformations
















1In all our extensive experiments, for each ciphertext there was only one candidate to be the plaintext.
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and
T (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) =

1 2 0 1 2 2
2 2 1 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 2 1
0 2 0 0 2 2
1 0 2 2 0 0




















The core map is G (X) =
(
F (X), F̃ (X)
)
. The composition P (x1, x2, x3) = T ◦ (ϕ × ϕ) ◦
G ◦ ϕ−1 ◦ S(x1, x2, x3) yields the public key polynomials
p1(x1, x2, x3) =2x
2
1 + x1x2 + x1x3 + 2x
2
2 + x2x3 + 2x
2
3 + x3 + 1,
p2(x1, x2, x3) =x
2
1 + x1x2 + x1 + 2x
2
2 + x2x3 + 2x2 + 2x
2
3 + x3 + 2,
p3(x1, x2, x3) =x1x3 + x1 + x2x3 + x2 + x
2
3 + x3 + 1,
p4(x1, x2, x3) =2x
2
1 + x1x2 + 2x1 + 2x
2
2 + x2x3 + 2x2 + x
2
3 + 2,
p5(x1, x2, x3) =2x
2
1 + 2x1 + 2x
2
2 + x2x3 + 1,
p6(x1, x2, x3) =2x
2
1 + x1x2 + 2x1x3 + 2x1 + x
2
2 + 2x2 + 2x
2
3 + 2x3 + 2.
We now illustrate the encryption/decryption processes. Let (x1, x2, x3) = (1, 1, 2) be a
plaintext. After plugging this plaintext into the public key, we obtain the ciphertext
(y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) = (2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 2) .
In order to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext we first compute





ϕ−1 (w1, w2, w3) , ϕ











As explained in Proposition 6.2, we now create the low degree polynomial Ψ′ using the low
degree polynomial Ψ, the scalars α1, · · · , α6, β1, · · · , β6 and the vector (Y1, Y2) = (b, b19):
Ψ′ = b8X4 + b10X3 + b4X2 + b7X.
The set of roots of Ψ′ is2
Z =
{
0, b8, b11, b19
}
.
The only element of Z which is solution of the equation G (X) = (Y1, Y2) = (b, b19) is
X = b11. If we apply the isomorphism ϕ we get ϕ (b11) = (2, 1, 1). We next apply the
transformation S−1 and then we recover the plaintext S−1(2, 1, 1) = (1, 1, 2).
The main part of the decryption process is the inversion of the map Ψ′. For this task





, where D is the
degree of the univariate polynomial. Given the complexity of this algorithm it is expected
that the degree of Ψ′, which is determined by the parameter D0, has the greatest impact
on the decryption time. This fact was confirmed by our experiments. Table 7.1 shows
some average encryption and decryption times for several choices of the parameters (q, n,
D0). For each parameter choice we encrypted and decrypted 100 messages. To perform the
experiments we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on an Intel Core i5-3210M CPU 2.50 GHz
× 4 with 12 GB of memory installed.
To finalize the description of the new cryptosystem, we suggest values for the parameters
(q, n,D0) for a realistic application of this encryption scheme. We base our choices on the











7 15 57 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.020
7 15 105 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.030
7 15 693 0.000 0.000 0.428 0.450
7 25 57 0.002 0.010 0.025 0.030
7 25 105 0.002 0.010 0.063 0.070
7 25 693 0.002 0.010 1.151 1.230
7 35 57 0.006 0.010 0.089 0.090
7 35 105 0.005 0.010 0.272 0.290
7 35 693 0.004 0.010 3.996 4.200
7 55 105 0.024 0.030 0.427 0.440
11 15 33 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.010
11 15 253 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.140
11 15 1463 0.000 0.000 1.954 2.120
11 25 33 0.002 0.010 0.016 0.020
11 25 253 0.001 0.010 0.337 0.360
11 25 1463 0.001 0.010 5.193 5.390
11 35 33 0.003 0.010 0.043 0.050
11 35 253 0.005 0.010 0.760 0.790
11 35 1463 0.004 0.010 12.366 13.180
17 15 51 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.020
17 15 323 0.000 0.000 0.267 0.280
17 15 595 0.001 0.010 0.711 0.760
17 25 51 0.001 0.010 0.106 0.120
17 25 323 0.002 0.010 0.984 1.070
17 25 595 0.000 0.000 2.070 2.100
17 35 51 0.009 0.010 0.223 0.240
17 35 323 0.006 0.010 2.039 2.110
17 35 595 0.008 0.010 4.367 4.420
17 55 51 0.028 0.030 0.763 0.810
17 55 595 0.028 0.030 12.742 12.880
Table 7.1: Encryption and decryption time for the new encryption scheme, 100 messages were tested per
key.
data collected with the extensive experiments of this section and with the security analysis





Length of a message: 19.4 Bytes
Average encryption time: 0.024 seconds
Average decryption time: 0.427 seconds




Length of a message: 28.2 Bytes
Average encryption time: 0.028 seconds
Average decryption time: 12.742 seconds
Public key size: 109 KB
7.3 Algebraic attack
Let us briefly review the algebraic attack (Section 4.3). Suppose that someone, who does
not know the private trapdoor information, wants to invert the public key P : kn → k2n
of the new encryption scheme (P = (p1, . . . , p2n)). She wants to find the pre-images of an
element (y1, . . . , y2n) ∈ ImP ⊆ k2n. This person only has access to the public key P . In
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order to accomplish this, she tries to solve the system of quadratic equations
p1(x1, . . . , xn)− y1 = 0
p2(x1, . . . , xn)− y2 = 0
...
p2n(x1, . . . , xn)− y2n = 0.
(7.1)
Solving the system 7.1 directly is known as the direct algebraic attack. One way to solve
this system is finding a Gröbner basis for the ideal
I = (p1 − y1, · · · , p2n − y2n) ≤ k[x1, · · · , xn].
The F4 function of MAGMA, [34], is the most efficient implementation of the Gröbner
basis F4 algorithm that is currently available. We ran extensive experiments using the
F4 algorithm of MAGMA to perform the direct algebraic attack for several choices of the
parameters (q, n, D0). For each choice of the parameters we used 10 different sets of
quadratic equations to run the experiments.
As we commented in Section 4.3, for high characteristic the field equations do not help the
process when computing a Gröbner basis. So, except for the case q = 2, in our experiments
we did not append the field equations to the set of quadratic polynomials for which we
wanted to find a Gröbner basis.
Our first experiments were performed with q = 2. In Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1 we can
observe that the time needed to solve the equations coming from the public key of the new
encryption scheme has an exponential growth in n. We can also see this behaviour with
the memory used by the F4 algorithm
3. This situation is different from the one observed
by Faugere and Joux in [25]. The difference lies on the fact that in [25] the quadratic
equations are produced using a polynomial of fixed low degree as core map in the HFE
3All the computations for q = 2 were run using Magma V2.20-2 on a Sun X4440 server, with four Quad-Core AMD










18 0.100 0.100 0.100 17
20 0.205 0.200 0.210 19
22 0.434 0.420 0.440 21
24 0.849 0.840 0.860 23
26 7.981 7.950 8.020 25
28 32.046 31.550 32.690 27
30 90.770 76.430 110.250 29
32 225.557 221.310 230.720 31
Table 7.2: Algebraic attack against the new cryptosystem for q = 2 and D0 = 386.
































Figure 7.1: Algebraic attack against the new encryption scheme for q = 2 and D0 = 386.
cryptosystem, and in our new cryptosystem the quadratic equations are generated via two
high degree polynomials. In our experiments, in general, these two high degree polynomials
have the same degree D and this degree increases as n increases (see Table 7.2). This is the
fundamental security improvement of our new method.
Another evidence that the complexity of the algebraic attack against the new encryption
scheme is exponential, is that the degree of regularity of the trapdoor function increases as
n increases. This behaviour can be observed in Figure 7.2.
In order to compare with the MQ-problem, we chose systems of random quadratic equa-
tions of the same dimensions (kn → k2n) and performed the algebraic attack against these
systems too. For each system of random equations, we found that the time needed to solve
such equations using Gröbner bases is essentially the same that the one needed to solve
the quadratic equations from the public key of the new encryption scheme. These data are
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ty q = 2







14 0.019 3 3
16 0.142 5 4
18 0.100 8 4
20 0.205 13 4
22 0.434 20 4
24 0.849 33 4
26 7.981 118 4
28 32.046 1121 5
30 90.770 2769 5







14 0.040 12 3
16 0.060 13 4
18 0.100 16 4
20 0.200 21 4
22 0.440 31 4
24 0.830 46 4
26 7.800 105 4
28 34.700 1087 5
30 87.810 2725 5
32 239.260 5549 5
Table 7.3: Algebraic attack comparison between the new encryption scheme and a system of random equa-
tions for q = 2 and D0 = 386.
shown in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3. Notice that the degree of regularity is the same in both
cases.
According to all our experiments, it seems that for q = 2 the algebraic attack is no more
efficient solving the equations from the new encryption scheme that solving a system of
random quadratic equations of the same dimensions. However, if we wanted to use q = 2
for our new cryptosystem, we would have to consider values of n of at least 80 to avoid
the exhaustive search. The estimated time needed to construct an example with q = 2 and
n = 80 is about 30 days and the estimated memory needed is 230 GB. Table A.1 and Figure
A.1, in Appendix A, show the time and memory needed to construct the private key of the
new encryption scheme up to n = 35 for q = 2. Taking this issue into account, we decided
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Figure 7.3: Algebraic attack comparison between the new encryption scheme and a system of random equa-
tions for q = 2 and D0 = 386.
to abandon the case q = 2 and switch to odd characteristic.
For fixed n and D0, the size of the matrices needed in the reduction method for construct-
ing the new encryption scheme do not depend on the parameter q (see Section 6.1 for the
reduction method). For example, the matrices for constructing an encryption scheme with
parameters (q, n,D0) = (2, 60, 1000) and (q, n,D0) = (17, 60, 1000) have the same size. The
benefit that we get working with a high characteristic field is that we can achieve a higher











12 0.071 0.06 0.09 32 11
13 0.136 0.13 0.15 32 12
14 0.289 0.28 0.31 32 13
15 0.785 0.76 0.85 32 14
16 5.564 5.5 5.64 64 15
17 13.658 13.26 15.03 96 16
18 31.392 31.01 32.19 128 17
19 70.301 69.61 71.14 192 18
20 148.208 143.69 160.73 288 19
21 307.118 303.22 316.41 448 20
22 942.269 663.62 988.45 681 21
23 2058.543 2050.51 2064 1107 22
24 18114.05 18099.43 18128.67 8334 23
Table 7.4: Algebraic attack against the new encryption scheme for q = 7 and D0 = 105.
For odd characteristic we carry out similar experiments to those performed in the case
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q = 2. Table 7.44 and Figure 7.44 contain these results for q = 7 and D0 = 105, and
several values of n. We observe an exponential growth in both time and memory as n
increases. But more importantly, Figure 7.55 shows that the degree of regularity increases
as n increases, which confirms the exponential growth of the time. The values of D0 that
we use are chosen in such a way that the low degree polynomial Ψ does not have too few
terms. The reason to do this is that we do not want to have a very simple function Ψ that
might introduce somehow a security weakness to the cryptosystem. For (q,D0) = (7, 105)
and (q,D0) = (17, 595) the polynomial Ψ has 14 terms.






























Figure 7.4: Algebraic attack against the new encryption scheme for q = 7 and D0 = 105.















ty q = 7
Figure 7.5: Algebraic attack for the new encryption scheme for q = 7 and D0 = 105.
In order to compare with the MQ-problem, we also chose systems of random quadratic
4For these computations we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on an Intel Core i5-3210M CPU 2.50 GHz × 4 with 12 GB
of memory installed.
5For these computations we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on a Sun X4440 server, with four Quad-Core AMD OpteronTM
Processor 8356 CPUs and 128 GB of main memory (each CPU is running at 2.3 GHz).
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12 0.071 32 4
13 0.136 32 4
14 0.289 32 4
15 0.785 32 4
16 5.564 64 5
17 13.658 96 5
18 31.392 128 5
19 70.301 192 5
20 148.208 288 5
21 307.118 448 5
22 942.269 681 5
23 2058.543 1107 5







12 0.07 32 4
13 0.13 32 4
14 0.28 32 4
15 0.79 32 4
16 5.6 64 5
17 13.74 96 5
18 32.19 128 5
19 70.94 192 5
20 144.09 288 5
21 310.52 448 5
22 991.72 681 5
23 1923.99 1107 5
24 18012.19 8334 6
Table 7.5: Algebraic attack comparison between the new encryption scheme and a system of random equa-
tions for q = 7 and D0 = 105.
equations of the same dimensions (kn → k2n) and performed the algebraic attack against
them. For each system we found that the time needed to solve those quadratic equations
is essentially the same that the one needed to solve the quadratic equations from the new
encryption scheme. Table 7.56 and Figure 7.66 show this comparison between the public key
of the new encryption scheme and a system of random equations for q = 7 and different values
of n. We can observe that the time required by the algebraic attack, in both cases, grows
exponentially as n increases. More importantly, we can see that the degree of regularity is
the same for both systems, and that it increases as n increases. Again, as it was pointed out
for q = 2, we can see that for q = 7 our new cryptosystem behaves as if it were a random
system of quadratic equations with respect to the direct algebraic attack.
We repeated for q = 17 all the experiments performed in this section for q = 2 and q = 7.
Figure 7.77 and Table 7.68 show an exponential growth of the time and memory required
by the F4 algorithm to perform the algebraic attack. The degree of regularity for q = 17 is
6For these computations we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on an Intel Core i5-3210M CPU 2.50 GHz × 4 with 12 GB
of memory installed.
7For these computations we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on a Sun X4440 server, with four Quad-Core AMD OpteronTM
Processor 8356 CPUs and 128 GB of main memory (each CPU is running at 2.3 GHz).
8For these computations we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on an Intel Core i5-3210M CPU 2.50 GHz × 4 with 12 GB
of memory installed.
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Figure 7.6: Algebraic attack comparison between the new encryption scheme and a system of random equa-











12 0.067 0.06 0.07 12 11
13 0.13 0.12 0.14 12 12
14 0.281 0.27 0.29 14 13
15 0.763 0.76 0.77 17 14
16 5.65 5.56 5.77 42 15
17 13.726 13.52 13.96 68 16
18 31.874 31.75 32.06 111 17
19 71.751 71.51 72.27 179 18
20 148.29 146.45 152.55 286 19
21 317.488 313.83 321.39 460 20
22 982.01 686.95 1018.91 772 21
23 1975.074 1964.34 2000.97 1197 22
24 18793.792 18689.94 18956.88 8627 23
Table 7.6: Algebraic attack against the new encryption scheme for q = 17 and D0 = 595.
shown in Figure 7.88. We notice that these degrees of regularity are exactly the same as the
ones observed for q = 7 (see Figure 7.5). Once more, we can see for q = 17 how the new
cryptosystem behaves almost the same as a system of random quadratic equations, with
respect to the algebraic attack. This fact can be observed in Table 7.78 and Figure 7.98.
We also studied the impact of the parameter D0 in our experiments and we observed
that reducing the values of this parameter do not affect the security of the new encryption
scheme with respect to the algebraic attack. So, it seems that we can take D0 as small as
the reduction method allows us. This behaviour can be observed in Table 7.89.
9For these computations we used the software Magma V2.20-2 on an Intel Core i5-3210M CPU 2.50 GHz × 4 with 12 GB
of memory installed.
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Figure 7.7: Algebraic attack against the new encryption scheme for q = 17 and D0 = 595.






12 0.067 12 4
13 0.13 12 4
14 0.281 14 4
15 0.763 17 4
16 5.65 42 5
17 13.726 68 5
18 31.874 111 5
19 71.751 179 5
20 148.29 286 5
21 317.488 460 5
22 982.01 772 5
23 1975.074 1197 5







12 0.069 12 4
13 0.129 13 4
14 0.291 14 4
15 0.811 17 4
16 5.73 42 5
17 13.615 68 5
18 32.046 111 5
19 73.084 179 5
20 147.597 286 5
21 317.329 460 5
22 1011.964 774 5
23 2036.291 1204 5
24 18914.614 8679 6
Table 7.7: Algebraic attack comparison between the new encryption scheme and a system of random
quadratic equations for q = 17 and D0 = 595.
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ty q = 17
Figure 7.8: Algebraic attack for the new encryption scheme for q = 17 and D0 = 595.

















Figure 7.9: Algebraic attack comparison between the new encryption scheme and a system of random
quadratic equations for q = 17 and D0 = 595.
Based on all the information that we collected with our experiments, it seems that the
algebraic attack is no more efficient in solving the equations coming from the public key of the
new encryption scheme than a set of random quadratic equations of the same dimensions. In
other words, with respect to the direct algebraic attack, the public key of the new encryption
scheme behaves as if it were a system of random quadratic equations.
Finally, in order to suggest practical values for the parameters (q, n,D0), we want to
stablish a relationship between the time needed by the F4 algorithm and the parameter n.
To accomplish this, we use the time consumption that we reported in Table 7.4 and Table
7.6, for q = 7 and q = 17, respectively. We extrapolate these data using the least squares
algorithm, and using the speed of our computer processor as a conversion factor, we estimate











7 21 12 0.070 0.070 0.070 64
7 21 14 0.280 0.280 0.280 96
7 21 16 5.620 5.620 5.620 128
7 21 18 31.580 31.580 31.580 224
7 21 20 144.350 144.350 144.350 352
7 21 22 656.540 656.540 656.540 681
7 105 12 0.071 0.06 0.09 64
7 105 14 0.289 0.28 0.31 96
7 105 16 5.564 5.5 5.64 128
7 105 18 31.392 31.01 32.19 224
7 105 20 148.208 143.69 160.73 352
7 105 22 942.269 663.62 988.45 672
17 51 12 0.07 0.07 0.07 64
17 51 14 0.28 0.28 0.28 96
17 51 16 5.65 5.65 5.65 160
17 51 18 32.08 32.08 32.08 256
17 51 20 147.98 147.98 147.98 416
17 51 22 1058.86 1058.86 1058.86 777
17 595 12 0.067 0.06 0.07 64
17 595 14 0.281 0.27 0.29 96
17 595 16 5.65 5.56 5.77 160
17 595 18 31.874 31.75 32.06 256
17 595 20 148.29 146.45 152.55 416
17 595 22 982.01 686.95 1018.91 777
23 69 12 0.069 0.06 0.08 64
23 69 14 0.276 0.27 0.28 96
23 69 16 5.573 5.55 5.63 160
23 69 18 31.969 31.87 32.23 256
23 69 20 148.192 147.02 153.18 384
23 69 22 989.413 682.47 1057.46 809
Table 7.8: Algebraic attack for the new encryption scheme for several choices of (q, n, D0).
q = 7 and q = 17, we conclude that for n = 55 the algebraic attack will need more than
280 operations to be successful. This analysis yields the parameters that we suggested in
Section 7.1.
7.4 Kipnis-Shamir MinRank attack
The KS MinRank attack or KS attack was discussed in Section 4.4. Although we are using
high degree and high rank polynomials as core maps, this attack could work if there was a
low rank linear combination of their Frobenius powers. Because of this, we have to carefully
consider this attack for our new cryptosystem.
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We now test our new encryption scheme against the KS attack, by performing extensive
computer experiments for the case of odd characteristic. For characteristic 2 the attack is
slightly different, and for the special case of q = 2 we give a theoretical argument (without
applying the attack directly) to demonstrate why the KS MinRank attack does not work
against the new encryption scheme. All the computations of this section were run using
Magma V2.20-2 on a Sun X4440 server, with four Quad-Core AMD OpteronTM Processor
8356 CPUs and 128 GB of main memory (each CPU is running at 2.3 GHz).
The main part of the KS attack, with respect to the complexity, is to solve the MinRank
problem. The original version of the KS attack was not as efficient as its authors claimed,
because the derived MinRank problem worked with matrices with entries in the big field
K. Recently, Faugère et al. [4] improved and generalized the KS attack, and were able to
break HFE and its generalization Multi-HFE for all practical choices of their parameters.
Their main improvement was to restate the MinRank problem with the matrices associated
to the public key, whose entries are in the small field k. This makes the improved KS attack
significantly faster than the original version.
In Section 6.3 we noted that the new trapdoor function P , which is the public key of the
our new encryption scheme, can be seen as a particular case of an unbounded Multi-HFE
cryptosystem, with N = 2 (for unbounded we mean that the core polynomials have no
restrictions for their degrees). Because of this, in this section we perform the KS attack as
it was done in [4] for a Multi-HFE scheme. For given parameters q, n and D0, we generate
the 2n public key polynomials p1, · · · , p2n of the new encryption scheme (P = (p1, · · · , p2n)).
Then, we compute the symmetric matrix Mi associated to the quadratic part of each public
key polynomial pi, i = 1, · · · , 2n. Let Q-Rank(P ) be the minimal rank of elements in the
K-linear space generated by the matrices M1, · · · ,M2n. In [4] they showed that Q-Rank(P )
coincides with the minimal quadratic rank of elements in the K-linear space generated by
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the Frobenius powers of the core polynomials F and F̃ . The KS attack is successful against
Multi-HFE when Q-Rank(P ) is low (see [4]). The main purpose of this section is to show
that Q-Rank(P ) increases as n increases for the new encryption scheme, and therefore the
KS attack will not work against this new cryptosystem.
MinRank problem: Fix a positive integer r < n (start with r = 1) and try to find scalars








If there is no solution, set r = r + 1 and repeat this step until a solution is found.
As it was proved in [4] for a Multi-HFE scheme, in order to accelerate the MinRank
problem, we can randomly fix N = 2 of the scalars λ1, · · · , λ2n ∈ K, not all to zero. In
our experiments we fixed λn−1 = 0 and λn = 1, and we used the Kipnis-Shamir modelling
for solving this MinRank problem. The reason to choose this modelling is that the minors
modelling uses considerably more memory than the KS option.
Before we continue with this attack, let us illustrate a way to solve the MinRank problem
with a toy example.
Example 7.1.
In this toy example we chose the parameters (q, n,D0) = (7, 4, 110). Let k = GF (q), and
consider the irreducible polynomial y4 + 5y2 + 4y + 3 ∈ k[y]. A degree n extension field of
k is K = k[y]/ (g(y)). After generating the core polynomials F and F̃ , using the method
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described in Section 6.1, we get the public key polynomials
p1 (x1, · · · , x4) =x21 + 4x1x2 + 2x1x3 + 3x1x4 + 2x22 + x2x3 + 6x2x4 + 4x23 + 5x3x4 + x24,
p2 (x1, · · · , x4) =3x21 + 3x1x3 + 4x22 + 2x2x3 + 4x2x4 + 2x23 + 4x3x4 + 4x24,
p3 (x1, · · · , x4) =5x1x2 + 4x1x3 + 2x1x4 + x22 + 6x2x3 + 2x2x4 + 5x23 + 2x3x4 + x24,
p4 (x1, · · · , x4) =5x1x2 + 5x1x3 + 4x1x4 + x22 + 6x2x3 + 6x2x4 + 6x23 + 2x3x4 + 3x24,
p5 (x1, · · · , x4) =6x1x2 + 2x1x3 + 2x1x4 + x22 + 3x2x3 + 6x2x4 + 2x23 + x3x4 + 2x24,
p6 (x1, · · · , x4) =3x1x3 + 5x1x4 + 6x22 + 3x2x3 + x23 + 5x3x4 + 5x24,
p7 (x1, · · · , x4) =3x21 + 3x1x2 + 6x1x3 + x1x4 + x22 + 4x2x3 + 3x2x4 + x23 + 3x3x4,
p8 (x1, · · · , x4) =5x21 + 2x1x3 + 5x22 + 2x2x3 + 5x2x4 + 4x23 + 6x3x4 + 3x24.
The symmetric matrices M1, · · · ,M8 associated to the quadratic parts of the polynomials
p1, · · · , p8, respectively, are:
1 2 1 5
2 2 4 3
1 4 4 6




3 0 5 0
0 4 1 2
5 1 2 2




0 6 2 1
6 1 3 1
2 3 5 1




0 6 6 2
6 1 3 3
6 3 6 1




0 3 1 1
3 1 5 3
1 5 2 4




0 0 5 6
0 6 5 0
5 5 1 6




3 5 3 4
5 1 2 5
3 2 1 5




5 0 1 0
0 5 1 6
1 1 4 3
0 6 3 3

.
In this example we want to find scalars λ1, · · · , λ8 such that the matrix M = λ1M1 + · · ·+
λ8M8 has rank one, i.e, we are taking r = 1. We now fix λ7 = 0 and λ8 = 1, and then
apply the Kipnis-Shamir modelling to get the solution (λ1, · · · , λ6) = (3, 1, 0, 3, 4, 6) for this
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MinRank problem. The matrix M and its reduced echelon form U are
M =

4 1 5 5
1 2 3 3
5 3 1 1




1 2 3 3
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

.
In the previous toy example we were able to solve the MinRank problem coming from the
public key of the new encryption scheme, and determined that Q-Rank(P ) = 1. In this toy
case we could use the remaining steps of the KS attack to recover the private key (this is
possible because Q-Rank(P ) = 1 is too small). However, for larger choices of n the situation
is very different, as we will see in the rest of this section.
To continue with the KS attack, we now use the MinRank problem to determine the
Q-Rank(P ) for different combinations of the parameters (q, n,D0). For each n we start by
taking r = 1 and then use the KS modelling. We utilize the Magma implementation of the
F4 algorithm to solve the equations produced by this modelling. Table 7.9 shows the results
obtained for q = 7 and D0 = 105
10. If for r = 1 the solution set of the MinRank problem is
empty, then we set r = r+ 1 and repeat this process until a solution is found. For example,
in Table 7.9 the expression “> 3” means that for r ∈ {1, 2, 3} the solution set obtained for
the MinRank problem was empty, so Q-Rank(P ) > 3 for that case.
n Q-Rank(P ) Average time Maximum memory
2 1 0.010 s 32
4 1 0.010 s 32
6 2 1.340 s 32
8 > 3 > 10 days > 50 GB10
10 > 3 > 10 days > 50 GB10
Table 7.9: KS attack against the new encryption scheme, for q = 7 and D0 = 105.
10The instances n = 8 and n = 10 for r = 4 did not terminate since the process had a 50 GB memory limitation. After
reaching this limit the process automatically stopped after more than 10 days of running time.
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In Table 7.10 we show the time and memory needed to find the solution set for the
MinRank problem for (q, n,D0) = (7, 8, 110) and different values of r. The same situation
is observed for other combinations of the parameters. We can see how fast those values
increase as r increases. The results in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 lead us to think that the larger
Q-Rank(P ) is the less feasible the MinRank problem is.
r Average Time Maximum memory
1 0.040 s 32
2 0.510 s 32 MB
3 297.410 s 462 MB
4 > 10 days > 50 GB10
Table 7.10: Time and memory needed to find the solution set for the KS attack against the new encryption
scheme, for q = 7, n = 8 and D0 = 105.
Now, for a fixed pair (q, n) we randomly choose a set of 2n quadratic equations in n
variables, and perform the same process that we just used with the new encryption scheme,
in order to compare with the results that we obtained for such a cryptosystem. The results
are summarized in Table 7.11. We notice that we get exactly the same results for both cases.
We also see that, for the new cryptosystem, the value of Q-Rank(P ) is independent of the
value of D0. According to our experiments and the fact that we are using high rank core
polynomials to construct the public key, we believe that our new cryptosystem behaves as
if it were a set of random equations with respect to the KS attack.
(a) New encryption scheme
n D0 = 105 D0 = 399 D0 = 2751 D0 = 4809
2 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1
6 2 2 2 2
8 > 3 > 3 > 3 > 3








Table 7.11: Q-Rank(P ) comparison between the new trapdoor function and random equations for q = 7.
Another interesting experiment is to compare the effect of the KS attack against the new
cryptosystem with the effect of that attack against a system built in a similar way, but with
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low rank core polynomials F and F̃ , i.e., a standard (bounded) Multi-HFE scheme. Table
7.12 shows these results for q = 7 and several values of n. We can observe that for the
standard Multi-HFE the KS MinRank attack succeeds, while for the new encryption scheme
(Table 7.9) it does not. According to Tables 7.9, 7.11 and 7.12, we think that the quadratic
rank Q-Rank(P ) grows as n grows.
n Q-Rank(P ) Average time[s]
Maximum Memory
[MB]
2 1 0.050 32
4 1 0.100 32
6 2 1.135 32
8 2 1.190 32
10 2 6.090 32
12 2 23.080 64
14 2 67.500 138
16 2 192.850 211
18 2 479.150 363
20 2 885.720 711





Using the same procedure, we can construct similar tables for other values of q. In the
Appendix we can also find the case q = 17. Based on all the information gathered from our
extensive experiments, we believe that the KS MinRank attack does not work against the
new encryption scheme in the case of odd characteristic.
For the case q = 2 we give here theoretical arguments to show why the KS attack does
not work against the new encryption scheme. We would like to recall the recent result on
the degree of regularity of Ding and Hodges [17]. We know that for an HFE system P the
degree of regularity is bounded by
(q − 1) Q-Rank(P )
2
+ 2,
where Q-Rank(P ) is the quadratic rank for the quadratic operator P . So for q = 2 we have





Since the corresponding quadratic rank used in the Kipnis-Shamir MinRank attack is
also given by Q-Rank(P ), we can see that if an HFE system has a high degree of regularity
when q = 2, this HFE system must have a high quadratic rank for the Kipnis-Shamir attack
as well. From this we conclude that, for q = 2, it suffices to show that our new encryption
scheme has high degree of regularity, in order to demonstrate that the KS MinRank attack
will not work against this new cryptosystem. In Section 7.3 we gave evidence that the
algebraic attack does not work against the new encryption scheme, even in the case q = 2.




Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we have created a procedure to build new candidates for multivariate trapdoor
functions using pairs of HFE polynomials of high degree. The way to invert these trapdoor
functions is through a low degree polynomial of Hamming weight three.
Using this trapdoor function we constructed a new multivariate public key encryption
scheme. Until now, no one had proposed any idea of how to use high degree polynomials
for the core map in HFE or any of its variants, since there always was the problem of the
inversion of such core polynomials. Our novel idea has allowed us to invert a map built with
two high degree polynomials by means of a third polynomial with low degree.
We showed that the encryption/decryption processes for this cryptosystem are very ef-
ficient. Moreover, we showed that the attacks that have threatened the security of HFE,
the direct algebraic and the Kipnis-Shamir MinRank attacks, do not work against our new
encryption scheme.
We performed numerous computer experiments to test the security and measure the
encryption/decryption times for several sets of parameters of our new encryption scheme.
The data we collected guided our choices for the parameters (q, n and D0) for plausible
schemes.
In the future we want to study ways of speeding up the reduction method to construct the
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trapdoor functions. Speeding up the reduction method will allow us to reach larger values
of n and therefore we will be able to implement plausible schemes with smaller values of q,
for example q = 2. We also want to study the effect that the matrix sparsity has on the
complexity of the algorithm used to construct the private key of the new encryption scheme.
We would also like to study the effect of the parameter D0 on the security of the new
encryption scheme. D0 cannot be too large because that would affect the decryption speed.
On the other hand, we think that D0 cannot be too low either, since that would produce
a polynomial Ψ with very few terms and that might be exploited by an attacker. Further
study of this point must be done to prevent possible attacks.
We do not think that the one presented here is the unique way to reduce high degree HFE
polynomials with the aim of creating an encryption scheme. Our new cryptosystem is only
a first step in this direction. In fact, the method described here was not our first attempt
to reduce high degree HFE polynomials along the same line. Among failed attempts, we
considered using a single polynomial F , but the linear systems we needed to solve had more
equations than variables and then we could not guarantee nontrivial solutions for them. So,






[1] Gwénolé Ars, Jean-Charles Faugère, Hideki Imai, Mitsuru Kawazoe, and Makoto Sugita. Comparison
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13 7.21 25 12
15 23.31 46 14
17 58.45 85 16
19 124.18 154 18
21 279.61 252 20







25 920.15 590 24
27 1620.43 891 26
29 2587.3 1272 28
31 4114.26 1774 30
33 6359.63 2491 32
35 9572.66 3349 34
Table A.1: Private key generation for q = 2 and D0 = 386.


















[MB] Number of rows Number of columns
Density
11 2.86 64 1408 1694 12.94
12 4.28 64 1836 2160 11.66
13 7.60 64 2340 2704 11.18
14 11.21 96 2926 3332 10.27
15 17.77 128 3600 4050 9.86
16 25.46 160 4368 4864 9.21
17 41.44 192 5236 5780 8.97
18 56.65 256 6210 6804 8.30
19 85.57 320 7296 7942 8.07
20 109.38 416 8500 9200 7.59
21 153.57 512 9828 10584 7.41
22 204.51 608 11286 12100 6.96
23 272.96 778 12880 13754 6.81
24 343.37 940 14616 15552 6.43
25 462.57 1166 16500 17500 6.30
26 560.41 1361 18538 19604 5.98
27 735.24 1685 20736 21870 5.87
28 911.06 1977 23100 24304 5.61
29 1148.27 2333 25636 26912 5.50
30 1402.11 2700 28350 29700 5.25
31 1756.90 3282 31248 32674 5.17
32 2019.73 3609 34336 35840 4.95
33 2523.72 4384 37620 39204 4.88
34 2984.43 5035 41106 42772 4.68
35 3661.46 5813 44800 46550 4.61
Table A.2: Private key generation for q = 7 and D0 = 105.












Figure A.2: Private key generation for q = 7 and D0 = 105.
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APPENDIX B
Additional KS attack data
n Q-Rank(P ) Average time Maximum memory
2 1 0.010 s 32
4 1 0.010 s 32
6 2 1.390 s 32
8 > 3 > 10 days > 50 GB
10 > 3 > 10 days > 50 GB
Table B.1: KS attack against the new encryption scheme, for q = 17 and D0 = 595.
r Average Time Maximum memory
1 0.040 s 32
2 0.440 s 32 MB
3 281.360 s 470 MB
4 > 10 days > 50 GB
Table B.2: Time and memory needed to find the solution set for the KS attack against the new encryption
scheme, for q = 17, n = 8 and D0 = 595.
(a) New encryption scheme
n D0 = 595 D0 = 5219 D0 = 9843 D0 = 88451
2 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1
6 2 2 2 2
8 > 3 > 3 > 3 > 3












Let k be a field and let n be a positive integer. For each α = (α1, · · · , αn) ∈ Zn≥0 we can
construct the monomial xα = xα11 · · ·xαnn ∈ k[x1, · · · , xn]. This gives a natural bijection
between the set of monomials in the ring k[x1, · · · , xn] and the set Zn≥0.
Definition C.1. A monomial order on k[x1, · · · , xn] is a total ordering > on Zn≥0, or equiv-
alently a total ordering on the set of monomials of k[x1, · · · , xn], having two additional
properties:
1. If α > β and γ are in Zn≥0, then α + γ > β + γ.
2. The order > is a well-ordering on Zn≥0, i.e, every nonempty subset of Zn≥0 has a smallest
element respect to >.
One example of a monomial order is the lexicographic order (>lex). We say α >lex β if the
leftmost nonzero entry of the vector α − β is positive. For example, in Z3≥0, if α = (2, 1, 0)
and β = (1, 2, 3) we have α >lex β since α−β = (1,−1,−3). This means that x2y >lex xy2z3
on k[x, y, z].





nonzero polynomial in k[x1, · · · , xn], where Af is a nonempty finite subset of Zn≥0. Define
the leading monomial of f to be
LM(f) = max {xα : α ∈ Af and aα 6= 0} .
100
Also define the leading term of f as LT(f) = aαx
α and the leading coefficient of f as
LC(f) = aα, where LM(f) = x
α.
For example, if k = GF (3) and f = x3yz2 +2x3y2z+z4 ∈ k[x, y, z], then LM(f) = x3y2z,
LT(f) = 2x3y2z, and LC(f) = 2. Here we use the lexicographic order.
If I ⊂ k[x1, · · · , xn] is an ideal, I 6= {0}, we denote by LT(I) the set of leading terms of
elements of I. We also denote by 〈LT(I)〉 the ideal generated by the elements of LT(I). If
I = 〈g1, · · · , gt〉 for some g1, · · · , gt ∈ I, it is clear that 〈LT (g1) , · · · ,LT (gt)〉 ⊆ 〈LT(I)〉. In
general these sets are not the same. When these sets are equal, the set {g1, · · · , gt} is called
a Gröbner basis for I.
Definition C.3. Fix a monomial order on k[x1, · · · , xn]. A Gröbner basis of an ideal
I ⊂ k[x1, · · · , xn], I 6= {0}, is a set G = {g1, · · · , gt} ⊂ I such that
〈LT(g1), · · · ,LT(gt)〉 = 〈LT(I)〉 .
It can be proved that every ideal other than {0} has a Gröbner basis (see [12]). The classical
algorithm to compute Gröbner bases is due to Buchberger [6]. Recently, two more powerful
algorithms to compute Gröbner basis, called F4 and F5, were introduced by Faugère [24].
If I = 〈f1, · · · , fm〉 for some f1, · · · , fm ∈ I, then a Gröbner basis of I is useful to
determine the common solutions in kn of the system of equations
f1(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
f2(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
...
fm(x1, . . . , xn) = 0.
( C.1)
When we try to solve the system ( C.1) over a finite field k of size q, we can add the field
equations. Thus, we create the ideal
I = 〈f1, · · · , fm, xq1 − x1, · · · , xqn − xn〉 .
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The field equations are added with the purpose of discarding solutions outside kn. For small
q the field equations allow us to keep down the maximum degree of the polynomials during
the computation of a Gröbner basis using the F4 algorithm. However, in [19] the authors
pointed out that for high values of q, adding the field equations is not as useful as it is for
small values of q.
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